Wittgenstein, transformation, and evolution 31 Jul 201131 Jul 2011 Reposted from my first blog, and edited. When Wittgenstein collaborated for a period with Friederich Waismann, the outcome was an unpublished book, Logik, Sprache, Philosophie. He was working his way from the logical atomism of the Tractatus to the holism of the Philosophical Investigations. They wrote: Our thought here marches with certain views of Goethe’s which he expressed in the Metamorphosis of Plants. We are in the habit, whenever we perceive similarities, of seeking some common origin for them. The urge to follow such phenomena back to their origin in the past expresses itself in a certain style of thinking. This recognizes, so to speak, only a single scheme for such similarities, namely the arrangement as a series in time. (And that is presumably bound up with the uniqueness of the causal schema). But Goethe’s view shows that this is not the only possible form of conception. His conception of the original plant implies no hypothesis about the temporal development of the vegetable kingdom such as Darwin’s. What then is the problem solved by this idea? It is the problem of synoptic presentation. Goethe’s aphorism ‘All the organs of plants are leaves transformed’ offers us a plan in which we may group the organs of plants according to their similarities as if around some natural center. We see the original form of the leaf changing into similar and cognate forms, into the leaves of the calyx, the leaves of the petal, into organs that are half petals, half stamens, and so on. We follow this sensuous transformation of the type by liking up the leaf through intermediate forms with the other organs of the plant. That is precisely what we are doing here. We are collating one form of language with its environment, or transforming it in imagination so as to gain a view of the whole of space in which the structure of our language has its beginning. [From Ray Monk’s biography of Wittgenstein, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The duty of genius, London: Vintage Books, 1990, page 305f] Compare this to Darwin’s treatment of the same issue: Certainly no clear line of demarcation has as yet been drawn between species and sub-species – that is, the forms which in the opinion of some naturalists come very near to, but do not quite arrive at, the rank of species: or, again, between sub-species and well-marked varieties, or between lesser varieties and individual differences. These differences blend into each other by an insensible series; and a series impresses the mind with the idea of an actual passage. [Origin of Species first edition of 1859, page 45] The one – Wittgenstein, in the Goethean tradition, indeed the Platonic tradition – sees a formal transformation, where the other – Darwin, the naturalist – sees a historical process. That Goethe is looking at parts of the same organism, while Darwin is treating of entire organismic forms of related groups is beside the point – even Wittgenstein and Waismann realise this. Here is the basic tension between the tradition of philosophy in the west, and the science of biology once the Great Chain of Being had been abandoned. And this tension remains. Taxonomists today are divided (not evenly) between those who think that systematics recovers history (so-called “process” cladists, and “evolutionary” systematists) and those who think it is merely a prologue, on the basis of which hypotheses about history can be tested (the so-called “pattern” cladists, also known as “transformed” cladists, echoing the comment about transformation in Goethe). Pattern cladists took seriously the notion that arranging organisms in terms of homologies generated groups not historical trees. A cladogram is to them a summary of shared, derived, characters (synapomorphies) and characters that are not derived and are shared, either transformed or not (symplesiomorphies). Colin Patterson, one of the founders of this view, wrote: “[e]very homology characterizes a group at some level in the hierarchy, and symplesiomorphy and synapomorphy are terms for homologies that stand in hierarchic relation: a symplesiomorphy (general character) makes a group, and a synapomorphy (special character) makes a subgroup. In this light, too, the rift between [pattern] cladists and [phylogenetic] systematists comes clearer into focus.” [Patterson 1982, page 305] The hierarchy is just a summary of these generalities and specialities. But the process cladists automatically assume, or rather many tend to, that the cladogram immediately equates to a historical tree. Cladograms, though, are representations of characters, not events. It is an inference we make that characters give us the sequences in which events of adaptation or speciation occurred. And evolutionary history is an explanation of these facts, which leads some people to wonder if there is some circularity, epistemically speaking. For we use the assumption that evolution occurs in a particular way – that synapomorphies represent one single event subsequently inherited by later taxa. Now, the epistemological issue is broad-ranging. It goes to the question whether we can recover history from the vestiges and outcomes of the past. This subject had been covered by Sober in his Reconstructing the past of 1988, but the issues are substantially those that were previously covered under the “covering law” model of historical explanation. Historical sciences are a general case of the historical social sciences. Western philosophy, however, has tended to rate a “presentist” approach to knowledge above a historical approach, on the assumption that real knowledge is of an eternal now. Philosophical problems are treated as if they haven’t changed since Plato or earlier, and as if all we have to do is inquire for ourselves, based on our intuitions (which are, by methodological convention, the same at all times and places), in order to sort out conceptual confusion. Hence Wittgenstein’s comment in the Tractatus I quoted in the last blog entry: Darwin’s theory has no more to do with philosophy than any other hypothesis in natural science. (Wittgenstein 1922 4.1122) Now compare this with a philosopher who was in part the target of Wittgenstein, Russell and Moore – John Dewey, strongly influenced by Darwin: Old ideas give way slowly; for they are more than abstract logical forms and categories. They are habits, predispositions, deeply engrained attitudes of aversion and preference. Moreover, the conviction persists – though history has shown it to be a hallucination – that all the questions that the human mind has asked are questions that can be answered in terms of the alternatives that the questions themselves present. But in fact intellectual progress usually occurs through sheer abandonment of questions together with both of the alternatives they assume – an abandonment that results from their decreasing vitality and change of urgent interest. We do not solve them: we get over them. Old questions are solved by disappearing, evaporating, while new questions corresponding to the changed attitude of endeavor and preference take their place. Doubtless the greatest dissolvent in contemporary thought of old questions, the greatest precipitant of new methods, new intentions, new problems, is the one effected by the scientific revolution that found its climax in the “Origin of Species.” (Dewey 1909: 402) Taking a historical approach allows us to see that form is an indicator of change. But the problem of the pattern cladists, the Platonists, and the general ideas of western philosophy remains and keeps inserting itself into questions of explanation and classification, in biology and in social science. Dewey. J., 1909. “The influence of Darwin on philosophy” in Appleman, P. ed. 1970, Darwin: a Norton critical edition W W Norton and Co, NY Patterson, C., 1982. Cladistics and classification. New Scientist, 94, 303–306. Sober, Elliott. 1988. Reconstructing the past: parsimony, evolution, and inference. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1922. Tractatus logico-philosophicus. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. F.Waismann, Logik, Sprache, Philosophie, G. Baker & B. McGuinness (eds.) (Reclam, 1976) History Metaphysics Philosophy Species and systematics Systematics
Evolution Myth 6: Darwin thought everything was due to natural selection 4 Mar 200918 Sep 2017 Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, according to Daniel Dennett in the book by that name, is natural selection. This is often referred to as “Darwin’s theory”. But Darwin did not always think evolutionary events or processes were due to natural selection. Read More
Creationism and Intelligent Design Intelligent designoids are unsure about me 27 Jan 2011 Normally I wouldn’t link to these guys, but I’m having a kind of odd week with the ID crowd. On the one hand the ever reliable Casey Luskin has declared I am condescending for suggesting we teach science free of religious overtones to young children (but Kelly Smith is more… Read More
History The Golden Age of Islam 12 Oct 2009 3 Quarks Daily has a series by Namit Arora on the high period of Islamic culture to which we owe our knowledge of classical science and literature, not to mention a host of scientific developments. Part 1 is here and part 2 is here. Keep an eye on this one. Read More
But the problem of the pattern cladists, the Platonists, and the general ideas of western philosophy remains and keeps inserting itself into questions of explanation and classification, in biology and in social science. I can’t help wondering if the Theory of Evolution hasn’t punctured Philosophies just as sharply as it has punctured some religions. It is just taking a bit longer to percolate through…. And yes, the Theory of Evolution isn’t the only way to ‘organise’ living things. I’ve seen a perfectly good guide to European flowering plants where the chapters were ‘Plants with red flowers’, ‘Plants with yellow flowers’ and so on.
Sorry for my english, I am French. I am a social scientist and I am actually working on (against) creationism, I have encountered your blog during my inquiries and I read it a lot (by the way, your work is really great). Your last post urges me to ask you a question, you may find it silly. Before asking my question, I need to tell you some of the things that I find puzzling about creationism and ID. First, I have been quite puzzled by the fact that a lot of analytic philosophers give room or appear to be friendly toward the latest form of creationism (i.e. ID). It is clear in the subfield of philosophy of religion (a field which does not existas such in France, french philosophers friendly to religion are usually working through hermeneutical or phenomenological philosophies, with a strong sense of history and symbolism, far away from the fundamentalists’ view of Scriptures), which tends to be dominated by conservative theists, like Plantinga or Wolterstorff to name a few. But it begins to appear in some other fields of analytical philosophy, like philosophy of law and political philosophy, where theistic philosophers are making some strong points against the constraints of Rawlsian’s “public reason” and against secularity in general (I really think that their points are not that good and that they are made of and in a bad faith, but that’s another problem). There is also a same kind of phenomenon in philosophy of epistemology, where the demise of the demarcation’s problem opens a really hospitable road for creationists’ claims, and they are happy to take that road. It seems to me, from my distant and french view point, that the only philosopher’s that seem to be able to resist creationists’ claims, and to uncover them, are the pragmatist’s philosophers, inspired by the work of Dewey. So, what is my point and what is my question ? My point is that I think that analytical philosophy, while it came from logical positivism, is strangely a really good vehicle for creationists and conservative theistic philosophers. And I wonder if it is not linked to the fact that analytical philosophy does not care enough for history and is still marked by a kind of “platonism” (as you say) that fits really well with the creationist’s ways of thinking. My question is on this idea : what do you think of it and do you agree with me that pragmatism is still the best philosophy to rework epistemology (acknowledging historical sciences) and to keep creationism and ID at a distance ? Sorry if my question is silly or if the response is too obvious to deserve to be stated, all those things are quite new for me (and sorry again for my poor english).
To begin with, your English is a considerable distance ahead of my French. Second, I doubt there is such a beast as “analytic philosophy” but it is true (and documented by Suzanne Cunningham) that many analytic philosophers in the English post-idealist tradition of Moore, Russell and WIttgenstein opposed or misunderstood evolution right up until the 1970s, and even later. Plantinga’s arguments, though risible, are framed in terms that make them something one has to at least deal with rather than dismiss outright. Also, note that analytic philosophy when it exists has a convention that even strange and silly arguments (like the Kalaam argument or the arguments of Dembski) are taken at face value even by people who know they are strange and silly. However, the stream of thought that begins with Pierce, James and Dewey, as you note, is very much based upon and takes seriously evolution. Part of the difficulty here is that it takes it seriously for the wrong or incomplete reasons. For example, almost all pragmatists take selection as the core idea. It is, of course, important as a way to avoid teleological regresses, but Darwin’s other theories, like phylogeny, are largely ignored. I think philosophy has only recently begun to come to grips with the actual import of evolution, such as Peter Godfrey-Smith’s book Darwinian Populations and Bill Wimsatt’s Reengineering Philosophy for Limited Beings. The Darwinian Turn in philosophy may not settle down for another century. References: Cunningham, Suzanne. 1996. Philosophy and the Darwinian legacy. Rochester: University of Rochester Press. Godfrey-Smith, Peter. 2009. Darwinian populations and natural selection. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wimsatt, William C. 2007. Re-engineering philosophy for limited beings: piecewise approximations to reality. Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press.
I certainly have no objection to Darwinian inputs to philosophy, but I’ve got to admit that I have a certain tolerance for typological/morphological thinking, albeit when I think about such things, I have the last chapters of On Growth and Form in mind rather than Goethian Urphenomena. I’d hate to be put on the spot about just why, but I have the suspicion that looking at character spaces from a formalist perspective has its uses—I believe S.J. Gould was also on record as having a certain fondness for essences and he’s not the only one and I know that the evolutionary theorist and biogeographer Geerat Vermeij, who is pretty hardball when it comes to explanations, is a huge D’Arcy Thompson fan. Well, maybe as the last man on earth who once and a while takes Aristotle seriously, it figures that I would credit formal causation as having some citizen’s rights along with efficient causation. By the way, I also wish I could manage French as well as our French friend manages English.
Thanks for your response. You are right, there is no such thing as “analytic philsophy” as such. But as a “convention”, it can makes some damages and bring some brillance to some bad ideas (supported by bad people who have a political agenda) , like you have said : ” Also, note that analytic philosophy when it exists has a convention that even strange and silly arguments (like the Kalaam argument or the arguments of Dembski) are taken at face value even by people who know they are strange and silly”. And thanks for the references, I will try to find those books (you are really indulgent with my english, but that’s nice of you).
Regarding “pragmatsim” you have mentined above, this is what Martin Heidegger has to say about it (and also about biologism which dominates Darwinian thinking): In ek-sistence the sphere of homo animalis is left behind. Domination by this sphere is the indirect and longstanding basis for the bedazzlement and despotism of that which one terms biologism, but also of that which one knows by the term pragmatism. . . . Thus even what we mean by the comparison of man as animalitas with “animals” is based on the essence of ek-sistence. The body of man is essentially other than that of an animal organism. The aberration of biologism… Martin Heidegger: The letter on humanism 1947.
It is the first time I have read that Goethe represents “platonist tradition”. Wilhelm Troll who represents German idealistic morphology started his textbook on plants (1954) by quotation of Goethe and posited “die Urpflanze”. It is actually Troll who considered cognition as platonic recollection and didn’t care of evolution. Goethian approach to nature is “Gestalt” approach that doesn’t care about internal structures, but is oriented on senses and human perception. No wonder that great non-darwinian German tradition is mainly based on his “plants metamorphosis”. One of the latest work written in this spirit is an interesting book “Metamorphosen im Insektenreich” (1999) by Suchantke. Needless to say that Suchantke has dismissed (neo)darwinism on the first page. There is also an interesting parallel between Goethe and Adlof Portmann’s thinking. Portman is considered by some Czech philosophers and biologists as the most original biological thinker of the 20th century and his work is intensively discussed there. For the first touch for those who are dissatisfied with modern biological thinking: “Transcending Darwinism in the Spirit of Goethe’s Science: A Philosophical Perspective on the Works of Adolf Portmann”: http://www.science.anth.org.uk/ifgene/hegge.htm#por2 Portmann was heavily attacked by neodarwinian establisment in the USA, but unjustly. See also my blog on Portmann views on form-development and descnet of mammalian testicles (but it is just a small piece in his teaching) and how he was attacked by Darwinists.
“Philosophical problems are treated as if they haven’t changed since Plato or earlier, and as if all we have to do is inquire for ourselves, based on our intuitions (which are, by methodological convention, the same at all times and places), in order to sort out conceptual confusion.” I must confess to finding this jaw dropping; like discovering aliens exist and walk among us. I never thought of studying philosophy as I take it as read that to understand Plato or an aspect of his work that I would have to have a pretty full on understanding of the historical context in which his thought emerges. Given the historical range of the subject that’s a hellish amount of work I have always been slightly in awe of philosophers as despite being very aware of it’s presentist inclinations I’ve naively thought that when dealing with it’s past it must work in the same manner. I always like those moments when you come across a belief or alien cultural institution that at first glance seems utterly bonkers until you begin to grasp the context and culture in which it is produced.