Pearson on Classification 21 Nov 2009 The classification of facts and the formation of absolute judgments upon the basis of this classification—judgments independent of the idiosyncrasies of the individual mind—essentially sum up the aim and method of modern science. The scientific man has above all things to strive at self-elimination in his judgments, to provide an argument which is as true for each individual mind as for his own. The classification of facts, the recognition of their sequence and relative significance is the function of science, and the habit of forming a judgment upon these facts unbiassed by personal feeling is characteristic of what may be termed the scientific frame of mind. Karl Pearson, The Grammar of Science, §2, page 6 Of course, he also wrote We have defined the scientific method to consist in the orderly classification of facts followed by the recognition of their relationship and recurring sequences. The scientific judgment is the judgment based upon this recognition and free from personal bias. If this were the philosophical method there would be no need of further discussion, but as we are told the subject-matter of philosophy is not the “legitimate problem of science,” the two methods are presumably not identical. Indeed the philosophical method seems based upon an analysis which does not start with the classification of facts, but reaches its judgments by some obscure process of internal cogitation. It is therefore dangerously liable to the influence of individual bias; it results, as experience shows us, in an endless number of competing and contradictory systems. It is because the so-called philosophical method does not, when different individuals approach the same range of facts, lead, like the scientific, to practical unanimity of judgment, that science, rather than philosophy, offers the better training for modern citizenship. [p18f] This is, of course, a philosophical claim… Epistemology Philosophy Science Systematics
Epistemology Some Sydney lectures I will miss 22 Sep 2009 Because I will be en route when they pop up: Sydney Ideas Key Thinkers Lecture Series 23 September JOHN RAWLS ON SOCIAL JUSTICEProfessor Duncan Ivison, Professor of Political Philosophy and Head of the School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry (SOPHI) John Rawls (1921-2002) has been hailed as one of the… Read More
Creationism and Intelligent Design Paper withdrawn from Synthese 30 Apr 2011 Massimo Pigliucci, head of the Philosophy Program at City University of New York, and Raphael Scholl from the Department of Philosophy at the University of Bern, have withdrawn a paper from Synthese. Here, with their permission, is the text of the letter they sent to the editors in chief: To… Read More
I always though of science as a way of knowing. It’s a way that includes reliance on evidence and rational thinking. I’ve always though that philosophers—good ones at least—employ this way of knowing. They just concentrate on one small aspect of the universe; namely, the thoughts and behavior of a particular species on a particular planet. John, do you think that scientists and philosophers employ different strategies when seeking knowledge?
I do not think philosophers use Pearson’s method, no, but neither do I think scientists do. Philosophy is metalevel discourse about things, including science. Do we know something at the end of our considerations? Well, we know how things are framed and the views that are in existence in a given field or topic. Do we find conclusions based on science? That’s a philosophical question, too…
I would have said this until very recently. But it can reach valid conclusions without using anything I would consider to be evidence. I think I just feel more comfortable with philosophers who use an evidence base I understand. It gives me a solid frame of reference I can follow, reject or accept in a way that I can’t do with arguments based on pure theory with the same level of speed or ease. Perhaps some philosophers are also concerned with teaching the subject? I think that is a trait that is not apparent in all academics. Some would be better suited to fund their research interest training parrots to speak I feel.
John: Has Pearson not “classified” one of the diffuse, unclear boundaries between objectivity and subjectivity? Or, am I off track here.