Woodger on Properties 14 Nov 2010 The whole notion of ‘having properties’ seems to me to be suspect. It may be that the notion of a thing having properties is a vestige of an animistic extension of the notion of a person having property (in the sense of chattels) to things other than persons. [John Henry Woodger, “Science without Properties”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Vol. 2, No. 7 (Nov., 1951), pp. 193-216] Metaphysics Quotes
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It really is too bad that Woodger has been so neglected by philosophers of biology – his discussion of homology, for example, is very insightful (even though I disagree with him). Hopefully that will change.
I think this is faux etylomogy for sure (it’s proprium in Latin, but the OED suggests that it was introduced into English as an analogue of private properties). But the essay is interesting. I think that we could perhaps be misled by the distinction into things and their properties/attributes; the hylomorphism of Aristotle is in my opinion now entirely unnecessary.
The way I like to talk about it, is to say that we ascribe properties to things. And we do that as part of how we form useful descriptions. As to what properties are, you can be a realist, a Platonist, or a nominalist. It does not much matter to me. The purpose of being able to form useful descriptions is served just as well, no matter which of those you prefer.
Gosh, do they? However will I cope with this amazing and unexpected news? You’d think someone might have noticed this before…
heh. My point: original meanings of words should not prejudice us against using them in the modern sense.
This is amusing – most of you are discussing the issue of property/attribute… John will remember an old axe of mine, with the use of ‘function’ to describe biological entities, which is echoed in the idea of an object “having” anything. Wouldn’t all properties be semantic, in any case? I mean in the material sense, in this case: an amino acid that is described as “having the property” of hydrophobicity is just less water-loving than one that is relatively hydrophillic. I can tell you that, with a bit of heat, ANY amino acid will dissolve in water, no matter what the degree of hydrophobic property it has. Once again, it all comes down to relationships between objects. I agree that it is “animistic extension of the notion of a person having property” as the author argues. Objects don’t own anything: they just are, and in being modify their surroundings in peculiar and particular ways. This is not a property, it is an effect of the structure of the object. However, I also agree that, at some point, we have to be able to discuss these things using modern language. “Having properties” is a useful short-hand…with the proviso that no-one mistakenly believes that the objects actually own anything.
Clem – What’s this thing you refer to as “the structure of the object?” Sounds suspiciously like a property to me.
I don’t think it need be. Structure is an aspect of the thing itself (of course, the description of the thing is semantic, and so the description of the structure has properties). It’s hard to find a replacement term for “property”: I tried “feature” and “trait” before I settled on “aspect” in the sentence above.
As I noted earlier, I think that original meanings of words should not prejudice us against using their newer meanings*. However, I think ‘trait’ is the best word to substitute for ‘property’ here; ‘characteristic’ may also work. * I teach scientific writing, and am a technical editor. I am on a crusade against the new use of ‘issue’ to mean ‘problem’, ‘challenge’ or ‘factor’ (or whatever meaning it has in Mr Stanton’s reply) . Issue means ‘to come out’ or ‘something that has come out’ (The January issue of a journal). In fact, journals of the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers specifically ban the use of ‘issue’ in these senses. /pedant mode off/