Philosophy quote: Nagel on Analytic Philosophy 1 Oct 20114 Oct 2011 In 1935, Ernest Nagel spent a year traveling around European philosophy departments, and he reported his observations on what he called the new “analytic philosophy” in the Journal of Philosophy. I was particularly taken by his programmatic description: the men with whom I have talked are impatient with philosophic systems built in the traditionally grand manner. Their pre-occupation is with philosophy as analysis; they take for granted a body of authentic knowledge acquired by the special sciences, and are concerned not with adding to it in the way research in these sciences adds to it, but with clarifying its meaning and implications. Philosophy for these men holds out no promise of settling questions which only the empirical sciences are competent to settle; nor does it assume the function of legislating what sort of things it is permissible or possible for the empirical sciences to investigate. Those who seek in philosophy a substitute for religion or a key to social salvation will not find it here. Found via NewAPPS Metaphysics Philosophy Quotes
Philosophy Another chapter on religion done 17 Nov 2017 Readers will recall I had a series on why people believe silly things… This is now a book chapter, with extra added citation goodness and many footnotes, although I haven’t yet resorted to Terry Pratchett’s practice of doing footnotes to the footnotes. Not yet. The book is New Developments in… Read More
Ethics and Moral Philosophy Arnhart on Hitler’s Ethic 9 Sep 2009 Larry Arnhart has a pretty solid review of Richard Weikert’s latest anti-Darwin guilt-by-association text linking Darwin to Hitler. However, I think he gives too much away. Read More
Interesting. The shift to the Analytic philosophy of today is subtle but important: we no longer clarify the thoughts of scientists, but we actually become scientists. This, apparently, is due to Quine. Later on, in Nagel’s 1954 APA address, he gave a definition of “naturalism” which might interest you: Two theses seem to me central to naturalism as I conceive it. The first is the existential and causal primacy of organized matter in the executive order of nature. This is the assumption that the occurrence of events, qualities and processes, and the characteristic behaviors of various individuals, are contingent on the organization of spatio-temporally located bodies, whose internal structures and external relations determine and limit the appearance and disappearance of everything that happens… However, Naturalism does not maintain that only what is material exists… The second major contention of naturalism is that the manifest plurality and variety of things, of their qualities and their functions, are an irreducible feature of the cosmos, not a deceptive appearance cloaking some more homogeneous “ultimate reality” or trans-empirical substance, and that the sequential orders in which events occur or the manifold relations of dependence in which things exist are contingent connections, not the embodiments of a fixed and unified pattern of logically necessary links. (1954, 8-9)
Nick Smyth: Interesting.The shift to the Analytic philosophy of today is subtle but important… In Nagel’s 1954 APA address: … not a deceptive appearance cloaking some more homogeneous “ultimate reality” or trans-empirical substance… (1954, 8-9) Both theses are appropriate and extant but the deceptive appearance does cloak. Improvements can be made by mincing further. Philosophy excels at Meta™ reiterated Notwithstanding the hype about splitting hairs philosophy goes numb whence sub “ing” towards proto sub and pre. The asymmetry is peculiar given the fierce aptitude with details. Failure to reduce the irreducible is ironic and revealing ( and very difficult and confusing too). Perhaps the indicated asymmetry explains ‘all’.