Philosophy quote: Nagel on Analytic Philosophy 1 Oct 20114 Oct 2011 In 1935, Ernest Nagel spent a year traveling around European philosophy departments, and he reported his observations on what he called the new “analytic philosophy” in the Journal of Philosophy. I was particularly taken by his programmatic description: the men with whom I have talked are impatient with philosophic systems built in the traditionally grand manner. Their pre-occupation is with philosophy as analysis; they take for granted a body of authentic knowledge acquired by the special sciences, and are concerned not with adding to it in the way research in these sciences adds to it, but with clarifying its meaning and implications. Philosophy for these men holds out no promise of settling questions which only the empirical sciences are competent to settle; nor does it assume the function of legislating what sort of things it is permissible or possible for the empirical sciences to investigate. Those who seek in philosophy a substitute for religion or a key to social salvation will not find it here. Found via NewAPPS Metaphysics Philosophy Quotes
Metaphysics On hierarchies 29 Jun 200922 Jun 2018 We often make an appeal to hierarchical relations, in social and political discourse, in religion, in metaphysics (or that odd part of it called mereology) and more recently in social behaviour in animals, called ethology. But what we don’t do much is discuss what it is that a hierarchy is,… Read More
Epistemology Phylogeny, induction, and the straight rule of homology 8 Jan 201122 Jun 2018 Continuing my “natural classification” series, which I am writing with Dr Malte Ebach of UNSW. After having experienced the circulation of the blood in human creatures, we make no doubt that it takes place in Titius and Maevius. But from its circulation in frogs and fishes, it is only a… Read More
Epistemology Metaphysical determinism 20 May 201227 Aug 2012 There is a hypothesis called the Sapir-Whorf Thesis (also known as linguistic relativity) in language that one can only think what one’s language permits you to think, and indeed forces you to think. This idea that some conceptual scheme can determine how you think is widely held. It appears again… Read More
Interesting. The shift to the Analytic philosophy of today is subtle but important: we no longer clarify the thoughts of scientists, but we actually become scientists. This, apparently, is due to Quine. Later on, in Nagel’s 1954 APA address, he gave a definition of “naturalism” which might interest you: Two theses seem to me central to naturalism as I conceive it. The first is the existential and causal primacy of organized matter in the executive order of nature. This is the assumption that the occurrence of events, qualities and processes, and the characteristic behaviors of various individuals, are contingent on the organization of spatio-temporally located bodies, whose internal structures and external relations determine and limit the appearance and disappearance of everything that happens… However, Naturalism does not maintain that only what is material exists… The second major contention of naturalism is that the manifest plurality and variety of things, of their qualities and their functions, are an irreducible feature of the cosmos, not a deceptive appearance cloaking some more homogeneous “ultimate reality” or trans-empirical substance, and that the sequential orders in which events occur or the manifold relations of dependence in which things exist are contingent connections, not the embodiments of a fixed and unified pattern of logically necessary links. (1954, 8-9)
Nick Smyth: Interesting.The shift to the Analytic philosophy of today is subtle but important… In Nagel’s 1954 APA address: … not a deceptive appearance cloaking some more homogeneous “ultimate reality” or trans-empirical substance… (1954, 8-9) Both theses are appropriate and extant but the deceptive appearance does cloak. Improvements can be made by mincing further. Philosophy excels at Meta™ reiterated Notwithstanding the hype about splitting hairs philosophy goes numb whence sub “ing” towards proto sub and pre. The asymmetry is peculiar given the fierce aptitude with details. Failure to reduce the irreducible is ironic and revealing ( and very difficult and confusing too). Perhaps the indicated asymmetry explains ‘all’.