My latest paper – Carving Nature at its Joints, a review 25 Nov 201225 Nov 2012 You can find it online here. A very interesting but ultimately, to me, largely frustrating book (because it didn’t answer my questions, goddammit!). Review – Carving Nature at Its Joints Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke and Matthew H. Slater (Editors) MIT Press, 2012 Review by John S. Wilkins Nov 20th 2012 (Volume 16, Issue 47) Academe Book Epistemology Logic and philosophy Metaphysics
Epistemology Atheism, agnosticism and theism 2: What it is to have a belief 16 Jul 201122 Jun 2018 Previous posts in this series: One. We talk a lot about believing this or that, and about faith and the content of faith, but we are often a little bit vague on what that actually entails and why. Philosophers, however, have a range of senses of “belief”, often shared by psychologists… Read More
Logic and philosophy Physicists on science 25 Nov 2007 I have a rule (Wilkins’ Law #35, I think) that if any scientist is going to draw unwarranted metaphysical conclusions, it will be a physicist, and in particular a cosmologist. Witness Paul Davies in the New York Times. Davies wants to argue something like this: Read More
Epistemology You and me, baby, ain't nothing but mammals 7 Apr 2010 The song of the title of this post is a catchy and highly amusing piece that suggests that if we’re just mammals we should have sex. It’s sort of a low brow version of Andrew Marvell’s To his coy mistress. Instead of Time’s wingéd chariot, we should do what mammals… Read More
he also addresses the grue paradox and law-derived etiologies, holding that natural law requires natural necessity and natural kinds require natural law. Hmm. I guess I’m going to have to read those. Dangit. acceptability of Humean supervenience of laws Humeanism is a bad (and somewhat confused) position. he does not seem to address the existence of centers; a mountain may have a peak even if one cannot easily distinguish where it and an adjacent mountain meet. A good point. Is it typically discussed in the literature (on kinds or on vagueness)? One sentence is enough to sum the claim up for me: “If there is no teleology in nature, then the Axiological Species Concept fails” *chuckle* the author argues that determinism is neither entailed by nor entails physicalism. obviously = The connection with natural kinds lies in the issue of exceptionless or exception-laden kinds in physics. ?? I guess I’m going to have to read that one too . . .
He does know everything – he just has this strange Socratic idea that by asking these questions we can find enlightenment. Sometimes it even works.