An old question: genes and responsibility

Here’s a judge doing what generations of philosophers and theologians haven’t been able to do: determine when determination is determinative:

In the report, [scientists] Pietrini and Sartori concluded that Bayout’s genes would make him more prone to behaving violently if provoked. “There’s increasing evidence that some genes together with a particular environmental insult may predispose people to certain behaviour,” says Pietrini. On the basis of the genetic tests, Judge Reinotti docked a further year off the defendant’s sentence, arguing that the defendant’s genes “would make him particularly aggressive in stressful situations”.

If, as I do, you think that everything one does is caused by one’s biology (but not, note, one’s genes), since everything that you are is biological, is this a logical implication? Should we excuse the violent because they are, well, violent by nature?

Assuming that the science is right (which John Hawks thinks it isn’t, and I am inclined to agree), what are the implications? Hawks thinks we should conclude that all people with bad genes should be locked up ahead of time. He’s doing a classic reductio, of course, but I wouldn’t put it past some politicians or other leaders of the community down the path of righteous intentions to suggest it in seriousness.

The fact is often adduced that people with a particular genetic disposition have a disposition to behave, not a determination to do so, and so we should still punish those who choose to act in a particular bad manner. But I think this misses the point. We all know now (apart from the odd Italian judge, misinformed by partisan opinion) that genes do not determine behaviour, and that the environment must be included in the equation: the interactionist consensus is that genes plus environment determine phenotype. And the fact is, the sanctions of society are part of the environment.

If you remove the sanctions, then an increasing number of those who have whatever genetic dispositions there are will tend to express those genes in ways that we do not want for our social order. In fact, the sanctions (assuming one does not buy into retributive justice or the theology that underpins that) are there for just that reason – they are intended to lower the frequency of behaviours. People had vague folk psychological ideas about “natures” before genetics, and we evolved a system of law and punishment to employ our biology in ways that were, in effect, social engineering for desired outcomes.

All that is left are questions of fact, about what genes there are and their effects, what works as a deterrent, and what outcomes we most ardently desire for our social order. Of course, that might occupy us for some time. But the role of environment on genes, and most importantly the developmental expression of those genes through maturation of the individuals, should not be in doubt. If you raise Bayout in conditions that trigger the expression of violent behaviour, he is no different qualitatively than any of us, and rather than remove the inhibitors of that behaviour, we should remove the conditions, as best we can, that trigger it.

People exposed to conditions of poverty, violence, and overdeveloped codes of honour and male right, for example, tend to be aggressive in stressful situations. So, don’t do that, as the old joke has it.