A quote on the ethics of belief 31 Aug 2010 Sometimes philosophers nail it. This from James McGrath: And no one man’s belief is in any case a private matter which concerns himself alone. Our lives are guided by that general conception of the course of things which has been created by society for social purposes. Our words, our phrases, our forms and processes and modes of thought, are common property, fashioned and perfected from age to age; an heirloom which every succeeding generation inherits as a precious deposit and a sacred trust to be handled on to the next one, not unchanged but enlarged and purified, with some clear marks of its proper handiwork. Into this, for good or ill, is woven every belief of every man who has speech of his fellows. An awful privilege, and an awful responsibility, that we should help to create the world in which posterity will live. [W. K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief.”1877] This, along with that other classic of 19th century ethics, “My Station and its Duties” by F. H. Bradley (1876), goes directly to the Great Tone Debate and why it matters what people believe. Another quote from Clifford: No real belief, however trifling and fragmentary it may seem, is ever truly insignificant; it prepares us to receive more of its like, confirms those which resembled it before, and weakens others; and so gradually it lays a stealthy train in our inmost thoughts, which may someday explode into overt action, and leave its stamp upon our character for ever. Epistemology Ethics and Moral Philosophy Philosophy Quotes Philosophy
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If one accepts this idea, this raises the question of what the right thing to do is if the beliefs most conducive to human well-being are not the true ones.
Clifford makes it clear that choosing a belief that is not reality based can cause bad outcomes for which one is responsible. Given that this is bad when this happens, it remains bad even if no bad outcomes occur, because they might. Hence he avoids the utility-alone solution. It’s an interesting paper, and I’m grateful to James for bringing it to my attention, given that I am a moral vacuum and usually do not know about these papers.
My question was on the possibility that beliefs might have effects on society independent of their truth.
Define “reality based”. Is belief in p*edophilia “reality based”? Is belief in the resurrection of Jesus Christ “reality based”? Is belief in last thursdayism “reality based”? Also is it ok for me to execute people who hold beliefs that I consider non-reality based to stop any bad outcomes that may occur?
Are you asking me to resolve such questions in the comments, Chris? The question was, are beliefs (it is assumed, about the world, not moral choices) social constructs under Clifford’s view of the ethical implications of beliefs? The answer is that he certainly doesn’t think so. He (and I) think that it matters if you believe falsehoods, because they will have moral implications under some conditions. You might falsely believe that the factory machinery is safe, but if it isn’t, people might die, and you would be responsible for that. If this is the case, then you are morally liable even if the unsafe machinery happens not to kill someone. Ergo, there are ethical implications to false beliefs. Of course there are other beliefs in play here. Of course there are moral values that are important even if (like me, but possibly not Clifford) you think there is no objective fact of the matter. That’s a different question to answer.
Only humans are moral entities therefore the question naturally only concerned the possibility of a human (or albino gorilla) being a moral vacuum. Nevertheless I enjoyed the quip!
I can be a moral vacuum while remaining a moral agent. I’m just not a very good moral agent, that’s all. Gorillas have a limited sense of right and wrong.
Well, since you say that Clifford makes it clear that choosing a belief that is not reality based, I presumed that Clifford provided a way to differentiate between reality based and not reality based. Or does reality = truth? In which case I refer to the famous philosopher Z. Beeblebrox , “Oh, what is truth, man?” Are people morally liable if they don’t know that what they believe is false, and they enter into the belief in good faith (ha!)? Or do they have a moral obligation to ensure that what they believe in is true before that believe in it? Are people morally liable if what they believe in is true, but bad things still happen? Is there a difference, morally, between belief, in good faith, in something wrong and bad things happening, and belief in something true and bad things happening?
A paper on one question need not answer all questions one might attach to that one. What truth is, and how we know it is something for a slightly larger discussion. Like this at 802 pages. All Clifford is dealing with is whether one is ethically liable for believing falsehoods. He thinks so, and so it is an ethical obligation to have true beliefs. That we do not always succeed is hardly the point, for otherwise we’d have no moral values at all, since we so rarely completely adhere to them.
All Clifford is dealing with is whether one is ethically liable for believing falsehoods. Does he mean believing in something that is known to be false, or does it include believing in something which you think is true but is false? Does he differentiate between beliving in something that is false but you belive it to be true, and believing in something that is true?
I glanced at Timothy J. Madigan’s, W.K Cliford and “The Ethics of Belief”, 2010 It answered my questions regarding his use of language, you may find it helpfull as well in addressing the questions you raise.
Aww, I don’t like reading philosopy texts, they hurt the brain. Clifford is not arguing true or false beliefs at all, but the evidence supporting a belief. Indeed, he argues that a true belief based on insufficient evidence is as bad as a false belief. But he does not specify what consitutes “sufficient” evidence. Is there a sliding scale of guilt? “You believe in something that is false and for which there is no evidence. You very bad. You believe in something that is false but or which there is some evidence. You not so bad. You believe in something that is false and for which there is a lot of evidence. You only bad around the edges.” What about people who’s beliefs were well supported at the time, but are now known to be false? Are there anti-mormons out there retrospectively baptising people into guilt? Is Clifford saying THAT sufficient evidence is avialable to make a determination of truth or falsehood? or WHERE sufficient evidence is avialable to make a determination of truth or falsehood, it should be considered? if the latter, if insufficient evidence is available, should no belief be entered into? I notice that for someone who presents a good case for not beliving in religion, Clifford liberally quote’s from the bible. Did he practice what he preached?
I prefer the second one, first is very Victorian Dad in tone. Although I think it is possible for beliefs to change in an individual, the very last remark seems a bit 19th cen. Detailed study of the way beliefs interact and reinforce other thoughts I think is the answer. Like archeology the act of digging for evidence is a destructive activity. I think the problem with parts of the debate at the moment is that answers have been given and conclusions reached, well in advance of evidence. Same dangers apply here as with beliefs.
I don’t see anything wrong about being a (properly constituted) Victorian Dad. We tend to mock the Victorian era as if it were a series of piano-leg covering follies. However, some very smart and perspicacious individuals lived then.
I was refering to language John, the tone not the content. First passage in particular. I did e-mail you thanking you for flaging them up as I can use them in a conclusion to some work. Not respecting past research on the grounds it is old, or the language somewhat dated, is very foolish. I thought my second sentence indicated my agreement with their views. Some of the best work in my own particular area of interest comes from this period and influenced me to study it further.
However, some very smart and perspicacious individuals lived then. Actually a hell of a lot of very smart and perspicacious individuals lived then.
I wasn’t supposing you were agin it, Jeb. Just noting that I think it a fine thing to be: a Victorian Dad…
I would prefer to avoid the language and tone of a victorian pulpit. I can’t say I note the style in youre own work. I am sure W. K. Cliford’s tone would have gone down very well with some of the victorian naturalists and ‘folklore collectors’ I look at. They had no problem with the folklore of their own class, but when it came to diffrent classes and cultures in particular Gaelic, they go all W.K. Clifford on steriods. I could certianly rule out being a Scottish Victorian schoolmaster in the Western Isles. Get caught discussing anything not sanctioned in Gaelic you were made to stand in the corner with a human skull on a chain placed round youre neck. I joke not. I think we are often blind to our own beliefs and mistakes, it is always much simpler to find them in others and bring out the skull on a chain. As these faults are very easy to identify and often stasifying for a mixed bag of cultural and political purposes.
N.B. I wonder if J.F Campbell read it? “The clear marks of proper handiwork” is a recurrent melancholic theme in his use of the tree as an image; which was suggested at the time to be an anti-darwinian concept. “Such a log I lately saw in South Uist. No tool mark was on it; it had lost its own foliage, but it was covered with a brown and white marine foliage of seaweed and dead barnacles, and it was drilled in all directions by these curious sea-shells, which are supposed by the people to be embryo geese. It was sound, though battered, and a worthy Celtic smith was about to add it to the roof of a cottage, which he was making of boulders and turf. It was about to share the fate of many popular tales, and become a part of something else.” I wonder.
I’m coming into this thread very late because I’ve been on the road for the last couple of weeks; but I can’t resist pointing out that J.P. Sartre, of all people, would cheerfully endorse Clifford’s point. Sartre, who could be rather Kantian in spots, maintained that any human action inevitably has a universal import because the general medium of our existence is discourse. I may be radically free to chose what I do and that includes what I choose to believe, but I should recognize that my beliefs are never merely private but go to define or work towards the definition of the human identity.