A good summary article on intuitions in biology 21 Feb 2010 The Studia Philosophica Estonia is not a journal I regularly read, but this article – “The Role of Intuitions in Philosophy” – is a good introduction to the topic, and it’s free. I tend to think that “intuition” is an empty word, myself. I like the phrase “traditional faculty view” for its ambiguity – the authors mean “the traditional view that intuitions are a faculty of mind”, but I immediately thought of “intuitions come from faculty members” [of some philosophy department]. Philosophy
Philosophy Mill on philosophical errors 13 Nov 2009 A fundamental error is seldom expelled from philosophy by a single victory. It retreats slowly, defends every inch of ground, and often, after it has been driven from the open country, retains a footing in some remote fastness. The essences of individuals were an unmeaning figment arising from a misapprehension… Read More
Accommodationism How to argue with silly thing believers 30 Jan 201420 Feb 2014 [Apologies this took a while; I’ve been rather sick] So, given all this [Why believers believe silly things, why they believe the particular silly things they do, and the developmental hypothesis of belief acquisition], how can you change a believer’s mind? It is tempting to say that you cannot, or… Read More
Biology Aware is finished. Now for something different 14 May 202414 May 2024 So I finished presenting the book Aware on my substack, which will now ferment in my bottom drawer (metaphorically) until it ripens. While that is happening I am preparing to edit some nineteenth century sources for discussions of classification, taxonomy, species, higher and lower taxa, and many other subjects. Does… Read More
That reminded me of something I read today on Peter van Inwagen’s essay “Modal Epistemology”. I’ll quote: “[a philosopher who does ‘all sort or fanciful modal judgments’] is unaware that the modal beliefs he expresses or presupposes when he says ‘we’d have had more room if we’d moved the table up against the wall’… and the modal beliefs he gives such confident expression to in his writings… have quite different sources. The former have their source in our ordinary human powers of ‘modalization’… the latter have their source in his professional socialization, in ‘what his peers will let him get away with saying’.”
What philosophers these days mean by the word ‘intuition’ today is pretty close to what Descartes meant by ‘preconceived opinion’, except that the former has an honorific connotation.
Oops. Delete the redundant word ‘today’ from that. I wish that this site allowed editing or deletion of comments.