Biology Taxonomist’s revenge 21 Jun 2009 There’s a long and distinguished history of taxonomists taking revenge upon friends and enemies (sometimes simultaneously!) by naming unpleasant things after them. Linnaeus himself named an ugly useless weed after his major critic, Siegesbeck, who had attacked the “sexual system” of Linnaean botany. More recently, Quentin Wheeler named three types… Read More
Evolution Social dominance hierarchies 1 Jul 200922 Jun 2018 Given the dynamic nature of dominance hierarchies among animals, it would be very unlikely to get a well formed control hierarchy in nature. Read More
Epistemology Notes on novelty 5: Evolutionary radiations and individuation 31 Dec 201115 Jan 2012 Notes on Novelty series: 1. Introduction 2. Historical considerations – before and after evolution 3: The meaning of evolutionary novelty 4: Examples – the beetle’s horns and the turtle’s shell 5: Evolutionary radiations and individuation 6: Levels of description 7: Surprise! 8: Conclusion – Post evo-devo Sometime around 1900, Henry Fairfield Osborn (the Ernst Mayr of… Read More
If I may muse on the subject of moral relativism vs absolutism in general, I’ve rarely seen people discuss the range of possible positions that are available, but I have, over the years, thought about it myself in brief, sporadic intervals. The most extreme version of absolutism holds that morality is not only absolute but also simple: so much so that you could write it down in a book. A more nuanced form of absolutism holds that while in a given context it’s always an objective question whether one course of action is more, less, or of equal moral legitimacy than another, the rules that govern such comparisons are infinitely complicated and dependant on context, not unlike the set of all true mathematical statements (including the unprovable ones). Advocates are more likely to suggest praying for guidance than memorising a book. The intermediate position between absolutism and relativism is probably what I would call pragmatic relativism, the position that if absolute morality exists out there in some infinitely complex and unknowable way, then for all practical purposes we might as well think of morality as being relative. And finally there’s a distinction between moderate and extreme forms of relativism, but I’ve not attempted to formulate the differences. Can you do anything with these thoughts that’s more insightful than making a paper aeroplane out of the page on which they are printed?
Can you do anything with these thoughts that’s more insightful than making a paper aeroplane out of the page on which they are printed? I think it might weigh heavily on how we think about humanitarian intervention. Should we intervene to prevent culturally embedded practices we believe to be harmful? There is, I think, a popular liberal academic position that we should not. And there is, on the other hand a moral realist philosophers position that we probably should, if not intervene, think of such things as consequential.
Adrian Morgan: I’ve rarely seen people discuss the range of possible positions that are available, but I have, over the years, thought about it myself in brief, sporadic intervals. Perhaps because discussing the philosophy of morality is difficult enough, but discussing the philosophy of moral philosophy gets too tricksy? Or should the meta-philosophy be easier?
josefjohann: Should we intervene to prevent culturally embedded practices we believe to be harmful? As I misunderstand it, moral philosophy is mainly concerned with the plight of runaway railroad equipment. Do we now end up with calculating whether pushing polygamists in front of the notional trolley to save a bunch of wife-beaters is morally correct? Or should we disapprovingly first push the vigilante moral philosophers? Can anti-interventionists intervene against intervention or must they first get absolution from the contradiction? Disclaimer: I don’t go big on moral philosophy. I think the golden rule and a general aim to be nice rather than nasty is all the moral philosophy most of us need. I don’t need a rationale for not being horrible!
Can’t say I’ve read systematically about moral relativism. But I was fortunate that my haphazard philosophical education included several classes with the wonderful Sam Fleischacker (now at University of Illinois-Chicago), who wrote a fine book called The Ethics of Culture. It’s a very thoughtful and accessible attempt to articulate a moral philosophy that stakes out a principled (as opposed to ad hoc) middle ground between the most extreme forms of moral absolutism and moral relativism. Includes lots of thought-provoking discussion of real-world issues rather than hypotheticals. Principled moderation doesn’t make for funny cartoons, unfortunately. 😉