On abortion

Comments (67)

1. John,

   Do you think that governments should view all abortions as the same? For example, do you propose that there should be no regulations against elective abortions in the third trimester?

   1. Of course not. But it is a matter of prudence; sometimes we have to kill late term fetuses to save the mother’s life. Ordinarily we should err on the side of caution (I don’t go as far as Singer to think that neonates could be killed if deformed, because that is imprudent), but while social order is threatened by allowing people to murder neonates, and late term fetuses are shepherded in with that, it is not threatened in any secular sense by early term abortions.

      We need to avoid simplistic slippery slope arguments. Night shades into day and all that…

2. Biologically, there is no reason to think of abortion as the killing of a person. It is not something based upon science. It is based upon a moral stance.

   Just wondering if you can clarify this with the recent Harris science/morality debates, do you mean that biologically there’s no reason to think abortion is the killing of a person or that it’s the killing of a person? Because if it’s the 2nd then as per the blogospheric bruhaha, this might just collapse into the question of what kind of moral positions (if any) we can draw from science in general.

   1. None. Moral positions must take facts into account (ought implies can, and all that) but no moral position can be rested solely on biological facts. Even utilitarian views rely on a moral value, itself unsupported, that a certain consequence is good. Harris’s argument, so far as I have seen it, is that science will tell us what allows us to flourish, which may be true, but it is an unfactual moral value that we should.

3. “Fertilised Fetus” is kind of a tautology…..An egg can be fertilised, but a fetus is a fetus.

   Australian politicians who cater to religious doctrines on behalf of a secular nation are cowards and toadies.

   Oh dear, help me to the fainting couch, when did you become so strident?

   Good post, I couldn’t agree more.

   1. One more time: Anger and stridency are sometimes necessary. I have said this since the fainting couch was first brought out.

      Thanks for the tautology watch. I pleonastically said the same thing twice over.

   2. What about a fetus that results from pathenogenisis? That isn’t a fertilized fetus.

      1. That doesn’t happen with humans, dragons yes, but not humans.

4. excellent essay, wilkins. i can never understand why countries that loudly bray that they believe in “freedom for all” are so quick to limit freedoms of those who do nothing to harm others; women, gays, ethnic minorities, atheists … it seems that if these mind-control zealots make their assertions often enough, the stupid masses will accept these assertions as true without any hint of critical thought beforehand.

   1. i can never understand why countries that loudly bray that they believe in “freedom for all” are so quick to limit freedoms of those who do nothing to harm others;…

      Because most people define freedom to mean the right to do what they consider to be culturally, socio-politically or morally right or correct.

      1. Is that like free speech? It’s only free if you agree with the majority?

5. Maybe they will go to hell, but surely that is between them and God, not them and Parliament?

   Doesn’t that assume a distinction between Hell and Parliament?

   Biologically, there is no reason to think of abortion as the killing of a person. It is not something based upon science.

   I’m a bit confused by this. I assume we all agree that killing a person is (in general) wrong, and that this is a moral stance. But then deciding if a foetus is a person rests on defining personhood, which is, at least in part, based on biology. If we define a person as a human capable of living outside the womb, then nowadays it’s defined by medical science. I can’t see how one can disentangle deciding personhood from biology.

   1. Whether or not we should kill persons is not decided by science (how would you test it?). Whether or not a fetus is a person is also not decided by science, although if being a person is defined in some factual manner by morality, science can tell us when that obtains.

      1. OK, I see. Although I would argue that given a definition of personhood, it is science that decides if it pertains in any instance. I guess we’re just looking at the same thing in different ways. I reckon it’s your problem: you’re on the other side of the world, so you look at things upside down.

6. I agree with much of this, but this bit, at least, is debatable:

   Subjective reasons do not rule in a democracy. That one person likes things to be some way doesn’t mean that anyone else is required to, even if that person is the prime minister or president. Democracies allow people to have subjective preferences, but not to impose them.

   Eh? It is perfectly possible to argue that subjective reasons rule in a democracy. It’s not one person’s subjective reasons, true, but if it’s a majority of the population’s subjective reasons, well then, yep, that majority rules, in general. That is, fairly obviously, a big part of what being a democracy is all about.

   In well-structured democracies, i.e. democratic republics, there are exceptions to majority rule, e.g. constitutional limitations which are enforced to protect the rights of individuals from the actions of the government/majority, or limitations which are imposed on the government for various good (usually) reasons.

   Under this framework the key question is not “Is abortion moral?” but “Who gets to decide if abortion is moral, and for whom?” In the U.S. the Supreme Court basically found that there is a constitutional right to privacy and that the decision is basically a private decision which is up to the mother, until the late 2nd trimester or so, at which point you are crossing the line (admittedly fuzzy, but the biological reality is that the line is fuzzy but real) from a fetus over into a person, and its rights trump those of the mother.

   In some ways this is a dodge of the original grand question of whether or not abortion is immoral, but it’s a pretty classic dodge widely used by governments and courts on all sorts of questions (e.g. the Kitzmiller v. Dover court allowed for the possibility that ID was true, even though it ruled it wasn’t science). Probably it is good that governments try and avoid grand metaphysical questions whenever possible, IMHO they are probably unresolvable anyway and civilization is better off if the government sticks to practical matters and the philosophers deal with the metaphysical stuff.

   😉

7. Ex cathedra, Johannes filius Wilkinius dixit:

   [Catholic doctrine] is between the church and the faithful, and if anyone doesn’t like it they can either try to change the church or leave it, as they see fit.

   But that’s not their view, killing a foetus is wrong in their eyes regardless of whether you are a catholic or not. One reason being that the foetus is not the mother’s to kill.

   Aren’t you arguing against democracy in general with this line? Consider gun laws as an example. Some people are pro-gun, some anti-, I’m anti- and I’m very happy to have that view imposed on other people because I want a society where crazies don’t have cupboards full of firearms. Any -cracy is about some group imposing their rules on other parts of the community. I might not agree that a stretch of road should have a 80 km/h speed limit, but the cop who stops me whizzing along it isn’t going to say “ok, that’s your opinion, I respect it, so off you go, as fast as you like”.

   With the fuss in the American blogosphere about gay marriage and your contortions here about abortion there is an tendency (which I find uncomfortable) amongst liberal commentators to try to cast their views as if they are derived from a deep and almost unassailable logic deriving from fundamental human rights (whatever those are), science or logic, but they are really just opinions (and very culturally bound ones too). I’m happy for gays to marry, but I see nothing odd or wrong in others having an opinion that it is unnatural or undesirable in some way. I’m not anti-abortion but I can see that it is repugnant to many people and why, whether religious or not.

   The world is full of slippery slopes. It’s OK to race greyhounds, but it’s not OK to organise dog fights. It’s OK to keep chickens in small spaces, but not to slaughter them inhumanely. It’s OK to deprive people of their liberty for misbehaving, or in children’s case, because they haven’t reached school-leaving age, but wrong to keep slaves.

   Let’s be honest, these are opinions, just as much as suggesting that platypuses are the wackiest animal in Australia. Opinions don’t have to be based on reason although it’s probably better if they are. What I object to post hoc rationalisations of one’s viewpoint presented as if that is how one arrived there.

8. Felt a rush of passion and agreement after reading your post. To the breaches!
   I find the goverment of my state to be almost without redeming feature, except that they legalized abortion. Left it up to the woman. I don’t like the idea of shitloads of abortions. I’d prefer it if we gave up the victorian (is that irony as I’m from Victoria?) sensibility about sex and all kids were armed with condoms and morning after pills before or at least as nature armed them with gametes. For the love of cod, some kids will have sex, whatever their background, why should we force kids to have kids or abort them if we can avoid it?

9. Three cheers for strident.

   “So I exhort and beseech ye, brethren, join in the Get Up campaign in Australia, and similar ones in your nation, to lobby for secular democracy.”

   While Canada does not have secular democracy, it does not have an abortion law: http://www.canadianlawsite.ca/abortion-laws.htm

   1. While Canada does not have secular democracy

      We don’t? As far as I know, the fact that our Head of State is also titular head of the Church of England has no legal impact in Canada. I am not aware that (unlike the case in England) the Anglican Church (or any other church) has any special standing in government. If I am wrong, please educate me.

      Or are you referring to the “under God” language in the Constitution? An unfortunate but ultimately meaningless piece of rhetorical fluff as far as I’m concerned.

      1. You’re right and you’re wrong. Canada has no established church. However, our constitution (not the Constitution Act, 1982, but the whole constitution, which we share in common with Australia, New Zealand, Jamaica, etc. and all the other Commonwealth Realms, overseas territories and Crown possessions) does have one binding religious statute; and that’s the Act of Settlement, 1701, which, among other things requires that the Monarch must be Protestant. This was in fact tested in court a few years ago in Canada, by a fellow claiming that the prohibition on Catholics becoming the Monarch violated Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms (our Bill of Rights). The court, of course, ruled that the Constitution cannot be invalidate some part of itself, and that the Act of Settlement, 1701 is an integral part of the organic law of Canada.

         So we don’t have the ol’ kirk like da mudda-land does, but we still must have a Protestant King (or Queen).

10. First Tone Wars and now abortion. Is it sweeps week?

11. There is only one basis for this that I can find. It is this: under Catholic doctrine, the life of a person begins at conception, at the fusion of sperm and egg.

    In North America there are a huge number of non-Catholics who also believe this. But that’s not the point I want to raise.

    I’ve always been inclined to accept the premise—that personhood begins with conception—but reject the conclusion to ban abortion.

    I don’t see anything fundamentally wrong with terminating the life of a fetal person for a greater good. I also don’t see anything wrong with euthanasia.

    What’s the consensus among philosophers? Is it true that as soon as you accept the personhood of the fetus you are committed to banning abortion because of some higher moral law against killing persons? If so, what’s the rational basis of such a position?

    I understand that in public debates it would be awfully hard to stand up and announce that a fetus is a person but I’m in favor of killing it anyway. That’s probably not going to win any votes for freedom of choice. But is it a reasonable position according to philosophers?

    1. Larry, I appreciate your honesty with this and I would like to see academic discussions on your position.

       1. Ugh. You might as well call a sperm a person too, if you’re going to be this loose with terminology.

          And you really think its a good idea to just say that euthanasia’s a great idea, with no qualification? No mention at all of the dangers in the vicinity of this topic? Like the Nazi euthanasia program?

12. Larry –
    Even without crossing from secular into religious territory, philosophers typically distinguish between humans (a biological category) and persons (a moral category). It’s also pretty common to think that a human only becomes a person by developing the capacity to act autonomously, which is why human neonates are usually not viewed as persons. Bearing in mind the distinction between humans and persons, there is a pretty strong consensus that it is immoral to kill (innocent) persons. There are some, but certainly a minority, of philosophers who argue that the “right to life” is a human right which must apply to all humans, regardless of stage of development. Thus there is disagreement among secular philosophers about the moral status of abortion. And both sides are probably “reasonable” by any reasonable criteria for reasonableness.

    Hope that addresses your questions.

    1. “It’s also pretty common to think that a human only becomes a person by developing the capacity to act autonomously, which is why human neonates are usually not viewed as persons.”

       Bob, I’m unsure of this or need more clarification. How do infant humans act autonomously? For example, apart from infants breathing on their own, how are their movements more autonomous than a nine-month fetus?

       1. James – Note that I said “human neonates are usually _not_ viewed as persons,” and this is precisely because they lack the capacity for autonomous action. This doesn’t mean that the “right to life” couldn’t be extended to neonates, but doing so couldn’t be justified by an appeal to their (non-existent) personhood.

    2. Bearing in mind the distinction between humans and persons, there is a pretty strong consensus that it is immoral to kill (innocent) persons.

       That can’t be the whole story, otherwise the trolley car problems wouldn’t be ethical problems. Don’t most people agree that you could sacrifice the life of an innocent bystander in order to save five others?

       And don’t most people agree that the bombing of cities during wartime is acceptable? I think that pulling the plug on an innocent brain dead person is also acceptable to many of us.

       So, there can’t be a moral law against killing all “innocent” people. It depends on the circumstances. I think it’s permissible to kill an innocent fetus person if the mother doesn’t want to have a baby.

       I’m not interested in quibbling over the issue of personhood and when a fetus becomes a real person. Even if there was an overwhelming consensus that a fetus is a person, my acceptance of abortion on demand would not change.

       Are there any philosophers who hold such a position or is there reason to believe that it’s irrational or illogical?

       1. Interesting argument. I do not know anyone who makes it, but I do not think it is irrational.

          However, and this is entirely an amateur opinion as I am not an ethicist (nor am I ethical – I am a moral vacuum), it strikes me that we allow the killing of innocents not because it is morally admissible, but because it is unavoidable in the service of a greater good. We permit “collateral damage”, in the American euphemism for killing innocent civilians in war, because the cause of the fight is just (in that case, defending W’s daddy’s honour, and getting access to oil) and one cannot prosecute war without putting civilians in harm’s way. We would not think that a war that only killed civilians was moral even if the cause was just. Innocence is a presumption of freedom from harm.

          The big question is when the mother’s wishes override those of the baby’s, if the baby is a person. I do not think that a fetus is a person, but the closer it gets to parturition the more personable it is. Morally, a late term abortion is not, I think, as bad as killing an adult, or even a toddler, but then I have no slippery slopes to shore up against.

       2. Of course the distinction between humans and persons is not the whole story, but that doesn’t make it irrelevant to those who are interested in trying to provide a coherent account of the moral status of fetuses. But maybe you’re objecting to the distinction itself — that might explain why you refer to a brain dead person and an innocent fetus person (in the context of personhood theory, these are oxymorons).

          Regardless of any such distinction, though, your position appears to be simply that abortion is morally permissible if that’s what the pregnant woman in question wants. There surely are philosophers who share that view. Given that this view can be stated without contradction, the qeustion of whether it’s irrational or illogical depends entirely on the reasons one has for holding the view.

13. On some metaphysical level, anti-abortion seems to be based on an emotional rejection of what might be called the scandal of epigenesis–the fact that persons come to be from non-persons over an extended period of development. But there is a contradiction in the behavior of the pro-lifers, at least in the U.S. While their arguments accord an absolute value to fetuses, they do not typically propose capital penalties for women who abort their fetuses; and, more importantly, they do not support policies such as universal access to birth control that would lower the actual number of abortions. They loudly insist that abortions be illegal, but they are indifferent or hostile to the practical steps that would make them rare. The situation is similar to what happens in the anti-drug wars for whom it doesn’t seem to matter that criminalization doesn’t actually reduce drug use even though the example of the campaigns against tobacco show that a public health approach can do just that. In all these cases, what really matters to the zealots are attitudes, not real-world outcomes: a rather Pomo state of affairs. “There is neither good nor bad but thinking makes it so; and if you don’t go along with our thinking, we’ll blow up the clinic and murder the doctor.”

14. “Subjective reasons do not rule in a democracy”

    Then why did the US invade Iraq? One conclusion might be there is no such thing as a true democracy.

    1. Well, not in America. I used to suggest that Canada and Australia, two democracies, should join up with Turkey and Indonesia, two other democracies, and invade the US to bring democracy to it (since it is an oligarchical republic, and we know it has WMDs).

       1. I’m sure Fox Noise would have a field day with that comment. But Australia has already severely corrupted the US culture with things like AC/DC, Crocodile Dundee and numerous B-grade actors, and now their bloody wines. A formal invasion isn’t necessary anymore.

15. This is not Protestant doctrine. It is not Islamic doctrine. It is not Hindu doctrine, or humanist doctrine, or communist doctrine or any other source that I can find.

    Just to add to your list, it is also not Jewish doctrine.

    An unborn fetus in Jewish law is not considered a person (Heb. nefesh, lit. “soul”) until it has been born. The fetus is regarded as a part of the mother’s body and not a separate being until it begins to egress from the womb during parturition (childbirth). In fact, until forty days after conception, the fertilized egg is considered as “mere fluid.” These facts form the basis for the Jewish legal view on abortion. —From “The Fetus in Jewish Law” by Fred Rosner, M.D., at MyJewishLearning.com.

    This is not to say that abortion is categorically permissible under Jewish law: it is neither categorically permitted nor categorically forbidden. All rabbinic authorities hold it permissible (indeed, obligatory) in cases in which it is necessary to save the life of the mother, but there is a diversity of opinion about other cases. The main point is that none of these rulings depend on an identification of the fetus as a person. See “Abortion in Jewish Law” at the aforementioned site.

16. Concentrating on official doctrine always seems like a none-starter to me. To the average guy on the street, official doctrine often plays little role in their personal views. A lot of Catholics in the West have no problem with birth control, despite the Vatican’s frequent (and often laughably inaccurate) claims about artificial birth control.

    It’s irrelevant whether anti-abortion sentiment is or isn’t officially part of Protestant theology, just as so many Western Catholics don’t seem terribly bothered by the bizarre dichotomy of officially having their beliefs proscribed for them by the Pope still treating a lot of the injunctions with a bit of a sly knowing wink “Oh, we know the Pope doesn’t like French Ticklers… but you know.”

    1. I think the real motivation on abortion law, as on homosexuality, is to control who mates with whom and when, which is the overriding and persistent preoccupation of the ruling classes; because it controls the inheritance of resources. That is rather Marxian of me, but as I always say, just because Marx said something doesn’t automatically mean it is wrong.

17. I only have time at the moment for a few brief comments

    I fully endorse and support John’s campaign for secular democracy. It’s the form of government most likely to preserve freedom of religion and, just as importantly, freedom from religion.

    I agree religions should not be accorded a privileged status in society nor should their claims be granted for any overriding authority of their moral prescriptions.

    Nonetheless, I am opposed to abortion on demand. I believe that all human beings, at the least, should have the right to life and that right should be extended to cover the entire lifespan of an individual which begins with the fertilized egg and ends at death.

    I should note in passing that I self-identify as an agnostic and am atheist for all practical purposes.

    The fact that a large number of conceptuses abort spontaneously is irrelevant. To imply otherwise risks falling foul of the is/ought fallacy.

    Granting the right to life to the unborn clearly raises the prospect of a conflict between that right and those of the mother. Denying that right on the grounds, for example, that the unborn is not a person – whatever that might be – smacks too much of trying to define a way out of a tricky moral dilemma.

    Anticipating another jibe often directed at pro-lifers, it is frequently alleged that there is an apparent inconsistency between their concern for the life of the unborn and their support for capital punishment. Their defense is a mirror image to the accusation, to whit, there is an apparent inconsistency between the pro-abortionists vehement opposition to the death penalty, even for the worst offenders in society, and their willingness to happily countenance the deliberate killing of millions of unborn children who are guilty of no offense whatsoever.

    1. Denying that right on the grounds, for example, that the unborn is not a person – whatever that might be – smacks too much of trying to define a way out of a tricky moral dilemma.

       Says who? I am certainly not defining personhood away – I really do not think they are persons. If you choose to think otherwise, that’s fine, but why should you impose that belief of yours upon me? They aren’t children yet. And not being children yet they do not have rights. I’m not imposing this upon you, either – you get to not have abortion if you choose (or your spousal unit does if she chooses). I (or my spousal unit) gets to have one if she chooses. And you cannot impose your philosophy, neither your metaphysics nor your ethics, upon me just because you are either (i) in the majority, or (ii) you feel really strongly about it.

       As to capital punishment, that’s a red herring here.

       1. The problem is obvious. You and perhaps your spouse do not define your unborn as a person but someone else does. Subjectivity vs Objectivity. It is not an objectively solvable problem. And once the unborn is defined as a person, morality becomes an issue, and they can indeed impose their morality and philosophy on you, because neither you or your spouse can speak for your unborn.

       2. John and anybody else, I’m interested in your definition of “personhood,” and I apologize if you already defined it and I overlooked it. During the continuum of human development starting with the fertilization, at what point does personhood originate?
          the beginning of limb movement?
          the beginning of mental response to stimulus?
          fetal viability?
          the head popping out of the mother?
          the entire body popping out of the mother?
          the first breathe?
          the first rebellion against parental authority?
          The last one is only a joke:), but not the rest of them.

       3. The right to life is usually described as a human right. In other words, it implies you only have to be human to qualify for it. The undifferentiated clump of cells that develops shortly after fertilization may not be a person but I think most people would allow that it is human. Personhood is a red herring.

          We also need to take into account that, as individual human beings, we are not just objects in three-dimensional space but events in four-dimensional space-time. The undifferentiated clump of cells that was once John Wilkins was very different from the newborn John Wilkins who was very different from the teenage John Wilkins who was different from the middle-aged John Wilkins. Yet there is no more temporal discontinuity between those different versions of John Wilkins than there is physical discontinuity between your hand, say, and the rest of your body.

          As for my beliefs, I have never sought to impose them on any one, I do not seek to impose them on anyone, nor would I ever seek to impose them on anyone. That does not mean I will not advocate them, however – in a mild and moderate tone, of course.

          1. I have toenail clippings that are unquestionably human. My hair is also human. I slough off a bunch of skin every day, all of it human. Does it have rights?

             And as to the 4D point, I certainly agree that a person has spacetime wormitude. But what makes a pre-personal part of me a person is that the overall worm ends up being a person. In the case of an aborted fetus, it doesn’t, and so I think that if we simply take a block account of rights here, you cannot use the 4D nature of physical things to suggest that a fetus has rights if it doesn’t make personhood.

             I certainly do not think you would impose your beliefs, which you are fully entitled to have, on others. Which is why you should not support laws blocking abortion, because that is exactly what they do.

       4. Although I pointed to the common distinction between human and persons in my apparently unhelpful effort to clarify how philosophers have approached the questions of abortion, I actually don’t think that viewing a fetus as a person is the end of the argument. The main influence on my thinking here was Judith Thomson’s famous thought experiment about a violinist drawing direct life support from another, unwilling person. There’s no question that the violinist is a full-featured person, yet it seems clearly permissible to unplug him. So, even if a fetus is granted full status as a person, that doesn’t imply that a woman is morally obligated to provide life support for nine months. In other words, the right to control how one’s own body is “used” by others seems to trump the right to life of those others. There are, of course, counter moves and criticisms of Thomson’s analogy, but it persuaded me that personhood is something of a red herring in the abortion debates.

       5. Bob, personhood is relevant because only persons have rights (including any nonhuman persons, on a Kantian construal), whereas humanity is something even my feces have.

          But I take your point that merely being a person does not place an absolute obligation upon other people necessarily. We do have, I believe, a duty of care, but that is hedged in all kinds of ways. Even if fetuses are a kind of person (say, a partially formed one) it is unclear to me this must take priority over the interests of an actual person, the mother. I suppose your point is that even if fetuses were actual persons, they would still not impose an unqualified obligation upon the mother.

       6. Once personhood is established, it becomes a legal issue and science only plays supporting role. The child also has a dependency on the mother or parents after birth. Yes, they can give it up for adoption, but that is not the same as killing it.

       7. But I take your point that merely being a person does not place an absolute obligation upon other people necessarily

          For a while I’ve thought that a principled pro-life argument has two hurdles to overcome, namely:
          1) Establish that a fetus deserves “person” status (say, by showing that it sufficiently resembles other entities to which we unhesitatingly accord personhood).
          2) Establish (by some means other than taking it for granted) that fetal persons’ rights trump those of the woman carrying it.
          While there are some efforts along those lines (which I accept as honest, if unconvincing), we also get a whole boatload obviously manipulative propaganda like mangled-fetus photos or outright lies about the harm abortion does to women. Which is why for the most part I refuse to dignify this movement with the label “pro-life” (their self-chosen term with positive connotations) preferring instead “anti-choice” (accurate) or just plain “lying misogynists” (also accurate).

       8. I have toenail clippings that are unquestionably human. My hair is also human. I slough off a bunch of skin every day, all of it human. Does it have rights?

          No, because rights only attach to an individual human being – even, in my view, at the earliest stages of development – not the detritus thereof. Of course, should one of those spent cells be somehow cloned and begin developing as an individual human being then it too should be entitled to the right to life.

    2. How do you feel about women carrying fetuses with abnormalities which will result in the birth of a dead child or one who will die soon after birth? Should they have access to abortion on demand or be forced to carry to term? What about sick women whose illnesses will get worse if their pregnancies continue, keeping in mind that many women become pregnant who do not have access (for various reasons) to birth control.

       1. For me, any legal ban on abortion that I would support would have to include exemptions on medical grounds, certainly if the mother’s life was at risk or if there was no prospect of the child being born alive.

          The question of a child being born with a serious illness is more difficult. I have seen heartwarming stories of children with illnesses that mean they will only live a few years who have apparently made the best of the short life fate has allowed them. And the parents, families and friends have sworn they would not want to have been deprived of the little time they had with that child. On the other hand, there have been stories of families crushed by the burden of caring for children with serious abnormalities.

          I think one measure of how ‘civilized’ any society is is how it cares for the least fortunate of its members. Simply killing someone, however young, because they are inconvenient, does not qualify as civilized. That said, however, any society which insists that such pregnancies are carried to term had better be prepared to make adequate provision for the care of those children, either by special support for the families or by taking them into full-time care if the families cannot cope.

18. Ummm…I think I screwed up the HTML tags…

    1. Fixed

19. You lay out your reason very well. However, I have to disagree. Biology dictates that a human will give birth to a human and not any other species.

    What we are talking about is the difference between personhood and humanity.

    At conception a new human is alive and growing.

    Morality than dictates when and where society conscious will draw the line. 24 weeks the fetus (homo sapien) could be a person. 21 weeks the human is does not fit into what we consider to be a person so the human can be aborted.

20. Jim Harrison,
    “On some metaphysical level, anti-abortion [position] seems to be based on an emotional rejection of what might be called the scandal of epigenesis–the fact that persons come to be from non-persons over an extended period of development.”

    That is a great point, and I think putting it that way, ‘the scandal of epigenesis,’ is food for thought.

21. I’m still confused about the argument over personhood.

    I can think of many cases where I would condone the killing of a real adult person so there can’t be a direct connection between being a person and having an absolute right to live under all circumstances.

    There has to be more to it than that. Ian, haven’t you admitted that you would permit abortion of an innocent fetal person under some circumstances?

    Furthermore, even assuming that a fetus is NOT a person doesn’t mean that you have to condone abortion. You could still be opposed to destroying “potential” persons. I bet most anti-abortion advocates would not change their minds even if it could be scientifically proven that a fetus is not a person.

    The argument over whether the fetus is a person is mostly irrelevant, isn’t it?

    1. I don’t think so, because we weigh the rights of the innocent more heavily than we weigh the rights of those might wish something for convenience’ sake. Consider the duty of care we owe to the innocent even if it places us in danger. That a fetus is a person (or not) is directly relevant as a first point of consideration; but it doesn’t necessarily resolve anything, as you say.

    2. “I bet most anti-abortion advocates would not change their minds even if it could be scientifically proven that a fetus is not a person.”

       And what objective scientific test could possibly verify that? After all is said and done, the truth value of a fetus as a person or not, is a subjective assessment. As far as I know, “person” is not a scientific concept, although it may be a philosophical one. The whole subject is legal and moral, although it may be informed by science.

    3. I’m still confused about the argument over personhood.

       I can think of many cases where I would condone the killing of a real adult person so there can’t be a direct connection between being a person and having an absolute right to live under all circumstances.

       It’s pretty simple, actually. To a first approximation, and probably even a second and third approximation, we only condone the involuntary killing of a real adult person in situations where that person is a direct and present threat to the life of other persons. E.g., self-defense, stopping a crazed gunner or terrorist, wars (well, just wars), etc.

       The only semi-exceptions I can think of are carpet-bombing in times of war, and capital punishment — and these both remain highly controversial in Western society precisely because it is much more tenuous and debatable whether or not these killings do anything to protect the life of innocent persons…

22. For me, any legal ban on abortion that I would support would have to include exemptions on medical grounds, certainly if the mother’s life was at risk or if there was no prospect of the child being born alive.

    So under such laws, the State would have the final say regarding the legitimacy of the abortion and may override the judgement of the woman and her doctor after the fact. Good luck with that.

    1. Granted the possibility of miscarriages of justice but the fact remains that, in a court, the decision can be reviewed and the case for the foetus argued in a way that is unlikely to happen if the decision is left to the mother and/or her doctor.

       1. So your argument is that women, with or without their doctors’ advice, cannot be trusted to adequately make those serious decisions for themselves, but judges are better able to do so. How very paternalistic of you.

       2. As I wrote before, quite obviously, if we grant the foetus the right to life from conception, there is the risk of a conflict between that right and those of the mother which demand equal consideration.

          In cases where the mother’s life is at risk, the decision is made easier on lesser-of-two-evils grounds. The mother may have a husband, other children, family and friends and a career. The loss of her life would be far more detrimental in terms of the harm it might cause. Even if she were a single mother and an orphan, she still has an awareness of her own life and the potential of her own death which the fetus lacks. Her right to her life – and the others to which she is entitled as an adult – should be defended just as vigorously as that of the foetus.

          I would also have no problem at all with the judge and attorneys in abortion hearings being all women. All I would ask is that, since the foetus is unable to speak for itself or retain an attorney to act for it, the state or court should appoint someone to represent it.

23. Of course, there’s the issue of due process (such as it is) but nonetheless, the outcome of any law is dependant on the vagaries of the legal system and the certainty of ‘miscarriages’ of justice.

24. To elaborate, I derive my view of rights and freedoms from Mill’s On Liberty. His basic principle was that individuals in a society should be free to do whatever they like up to the point at which their behaviour began to restrict the rights of others to do likewise. Society only has a right to intervene to protect others from the consequences of an individual’s actions not the individuals themselves.

    Moreover, as Chris Schoen pointed out, rights are not ‘use them or lose them’ privileges. You do not lose your right to free speech, for example, if you do not exercise it within 90 days of becoming eligible for it. In other words, what is being a guaranteed is the option to speak freely at any point in the future. And that guarantee subsists in rules that seek to regulate the behavior of any others who might be inclined to deprive individuals those options.

    Another point is that the right to life stands in a different relationship to the individual than other specified rights in much the same way that existence is not a predicate property of an object in the same way as mass or height or colour. For example, individuals might find their right to free speech abridged, say under wartime emergency regulations, but the full freedom can be restored once peace is declared and the emergency lifted. Once an individual is dead, however, all bets are off. Killing someone denies them all future options and, if done without adequate justification, arguably constitutes the worst offense one individual can commit against another on those grounds alone.

    Quite obviously, the foetus is unable to exercise the rights and freedoms of a mature adult but then so is the newborn or the toddler or the young child yet we do not deprive the latter of the right to life.

    It seems to me that personhood is more like a legal fiction or, as Bob Koepp put it a ‘moral category” but, either way, is altogether too fuzzy a concept on which to ground a decision about whether to end the existence of a human individual which has already begun to develop, even if it is far from being fully-formed.

    1. The real world is under no obligation to provide us with convenient, nice, neat, categories. As several have noted, biology shows that “personhood” develops gradually, and it is *somewhat* arbitrary where exactly you cross the line from personhood to non-personhood.

       But this doesn’t mean the distinction is meaningless, just that there is a grey area. IMHO the right position is to acknowledge the fuzziness and thus be highly cautious before making permanent and violent life-ending decisions.

       Thus, OK, newborns might not have all of the personhood qualities that an adult does, but it’s pretty close. Ditto for babies that are viable outside of the womb, basically the last trimester. They deserve lots of protection (excepting extreme cases like life of the mother).

       But if you go back far enough into the pregnancy you are beyond any gray area about personhood, and you have something with no significant conscious activity, etc. And then, IMHO, giving such things the full rights of persons is anachronistic, leads to lots of self-contradictions and incoherancies (e.g. rights for skin cells), etc.

       1. Is ‘personhood’ an observable biological property or is it more something that, like beauty, exists only in the eye of the beholder?

          If we equate it with awareness, with being a conscious and autonomous moral agent, how does that help? My understanding is that if an adult individual’s consciousness is impaired or lost for a period, we do not also assume that their rights are suspended for the duration. Yet without conscious awareness what are we but a mass of cells? Granted that, in an adult, that mass is far greater and more differentiated than that of a foetus but is the difference in scale alone significant?

25. One thing that I should have perhaps said in the post is that a Sorites problem exists in many useful categories, both inside moral and legal cases and out. But to argue that everything is a slippery slope is to commit the slippery slope fallacy. I can say that a single celled zygote is not a person and is owed no moral duty and that a neonate is and should be. There is no contradiction here just because there is no sharp boundary between the two. In my view, we err on the side of caution by extending some personhood rights to third trimester fetuses, and this is right, but even there; if the choice is between the life of an actualised developed person and something that might become one, I am going to prefer the mother’s life. What the mother chooses to do as a person capable of making moral decisions is up to her – some may chose to sacrifice their present for a potential future child. That’s fine, but it cannot be mandated by law.

    I once quoted this on this blog; I do so again:

    No lines can be laid down for civil or political wisdom. They are incapable of exact definition. But, though no man can draw a stroke between the confines of day and night, yet light and darkness are upon the whole tolerably distinguishable. [Edmund Burke. Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents, 1770, Select Works, Vol. I, p39]

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