Community, unbelief, and the rise of secularism

One of the things that losing full use of a limb causes, is that everything takes four times as long as it used to. So I haven’t blogged due to my being very busy, tired, or both. Sorry. I promised to reflect out loud on the Global Atheist Conspiracy Convention, but haven’t been able to find time to think. It’s Saturday in the Favoured Nation, so here goes.

This was the first time I attended such an event. I didn’t quite know what to expect. I have been to many ideology-based conferences, events and happenings over the years and one thing that they all have in common is attempting to build a sense of community. Indeed, that is what my friend and Good Twin PZ Myers spoke on. We had lunch the day before his talk and I noted a few things I’d like to share with you now.

First of all if you want to build a community you have to have a set of shared values, rituals and practices. These are, if you like, the nature of the community. Since atheism is defined in various ways, that is difficult, and PZ tried to define the atheist community in terms of truth, autonomy and community. The problem is, these are values also held by many other communities, and they are not the very same communities. I know many liberal religious folk who also value science, truth and personal autonomy, and many atheists who do not. So while I applaud his picking these values, he hasn’t quite picked out the identifier and community builders of an atheist community.

What does achieve this? Well, we can look to other successful community building traditions. One of the most obvious is, of course, religion. What is it that makes religion so socially persistent and able to withstand thousands of years of change? My answer, the one I gave to PZ, was the Costly Signalling hypothesis: what makes a religion stable and causes social cohesion is not the ideas they share, but the absurd and contingent flags they carry. The reason why, for example, a Baptist can go anywhere in the world and find a community among any ethnicity, language, or class, is that what unites Baptists everywhere are a set of practices and beliefs so silly that one can only share them with other Baptists. That is, by the way, why creationism is so socially adaptive: the only folk you can share it with in practice are those who are in your community. Everybody else just laughs at you (yes, Xenu. I’m looking at you).

The Costly Signalling Hypothesis (CSH) is based on work done by evolutionary theorist Amotz Zahavi, who proposed that apparently handicapping traits like the peacock’s tail serve as honest advertisements. They show the virtues of the organism by signalling in ways that cannot be faked. This has been taken up as an explanation of social facets of religion, as the costly signalling hypothesis of religion promoted by Joseph Bulbulia. What makes one a member of the community is that one is advertising in costly ways that one is a member.

Crucifix

Even such apparently easy things as crossing oneself is costly, because the signalling is to be automatic (and in the right direction: orthodox do it the opposite way to Catholics), and it takes a lot of time to make it so. Learning catechisms, going to services, saying rosaries and so forth all take an investment of time and effort, and as time and effort are scarce resources, the result is that one is not able to easily fake being a member of that community.

Atheist badge

Add to this tithing, sacrifices, volunteering in burial societies and charitable work, and so forth, and to be a member of a community like this is not for the dilettante. Atheism has nothing comparable. At best it has the wearing of the Atheist “A” or t-shirts with the relevant slogans. Its charitable work tends to be state run through local government and health agencies. It is hard to identify community when the community is not definable in terms that are positive, and atheism counts as “unbelief” in other people’s defining views.

Now I have argued before that there are many senses of atheism (I am a functional atheist, in that I do not live my life on the basis of the possibility of gods existing; I am a philosophical agnostic in that I do not rule all deities out. Go read my arguments). A positive atheist has a costly belief in our present social context: to positively disbelieve in a deity is to mark oneself out as a baby-killing oath-breaker. But many people, like me, are atheists only in the sense that they happen to lack a belief in a deity. What are our costly signals?

Why this matters is in part due to the very reasons why the social aspect of religions evolved in the first place. In traditional societies, which were small, you knew every person, their relatedness to you (according to some social conventions), and whether you were equals, or one was subordinate to the other. This sets up a “working memory” constraint – we can only track these relationships for a certain number of people (possibly Dunbar’s Number, or about 150 individuals plus or minus). This matters because you need to calculate (or intuit – I’m not supposing that you actually do a computation) the coefficient of relatedness to work out to whom you owe, and from whom you are owed, mutual aid. This is known as reciprocal altruism. I owe my family more aid than I owe someone I am more distantly related to (Haldane’s quip about sacrificing one’s life for two siblings or eight cousins illustrates this). We evolved through kin selection, but when we get into larger societies, that breaks down.

When societies become cosmopolitan, which is effectively to say when they become sedentary, territorial and agricultural, there are too many people to track. You need to know who you owe reciprocal altruism to, and who you do not, and this is an urgent issue. There are too many people to help all the time, or else your resources will become exhausted as parasites exploit you. You need also to know who can be relied upon to help you or your children and family in hard times. In urbanised society, that is a nontrivial issue.

So honest signalling is a way of ensuring this sort of conformity and reciprocality. And atheists do not have it. Anyone can wear the badge or t-shirt, and there is no exclusion of defectors, apart from nasty comments on a blog. Something is needed that is not universally attractive, so that it doesn’t also include humanists, liberal progressives, communists, existentialists, and all the other ideologies in play in the same general intellectual stream.

My experience of the Convention was that most there were pleased to be in a majority of like-minded people (not, I hasten to add, identically-minded people), but this led sometimes to the other side of social cohesion: exclusion. Those who disagreed with the majority view were sometimes sneered at, sometimes mocked and sometimes made the objects of hatred outright. I was very disappointed with the general tendency to demonise Muslims, as if the tribal imamism of the Taliban was comparable with the urbane Islam of a Turkish or Pakistani scientist or public intellectual. The extreme stereotyping was almost laughable in its viciousness, if not for the fact that this was the community that was, according to the slogan of the convention, celebrating reason.

A socially cohesive group that defines an in-group by definition defines out groups as well. You can call them “sheep”, “fools”, or worse, “inhuman”, the traditional way to justify treating the out group badly. Many tribal societies call themselves something like “the people” and outsiders something like “ghosts” or “demons”. We see this more subtly when Christians state as fact that atheists themselves cannot be fully human (because they are immoral, deny their spiritual side, or fail to have the full range of emotions like love).

Atheists, lacking much in the way of a “nature”, seem to find most of their in-group identification in terms of defining the out-group. This makes sense if the movement is defined by the rejection of someone else’s views. This is why I spent so much time trying to identify what the term means in my “Atheism, agnosticism and theism” series. If we can find a set of views that atheists, and only atheists hold, and they are costly and hard to fake, then we have a chance of a community developing. My fear is that there is no such signal. Perhaps we could invent one (maybe rituals involving the reading of famous atheist writings at meetings), but I think that unless it happens more organically, the hope for an atheist community, complete with reciprocal aid, is pretty forlorn.

As I sit in my bedsit, unable to move, I find it interesting that atheists and agnostics have not banded together to come to help me. Instead, I was helped by two people: someone who was raised in Christian virtues and someone who is a secularised Jew. Both are irreligious, and both are atheists, but they are not helping me qua atheists, but as friends, and had I no friends here in Melbourne, I would have been alone. This would not have been the case if I were a Baptist still. Most of the assistance I have got comes from the Catholic hospital I went to in the first place.

I have often complained about the tribalism of atheism. I still do, because I identify myself largely as a humanist rather than an atheist (there’s a set of values for you!). But it should be said that PZ is right: atheists need a community. Religions, along with political movements, sporting clubs, and hobby associations, all have worked out how to do this. Atheists should perhaps observe this and work out how to do it too. Just don’t build cathedrals to atheism, okay, unless you are prepared to fund science in them.

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Update

I spent the weekend going to the Global Atheist Conspiracy Convention, courtesy of PZ Myers, the organisers, and Neil Thomason who drove me. I will write some extended reflections on it over the next few days, but I have a lot of things to resolve first, like how to shower, park places, and get around using crutches.

I must apologise to the GAC organisers for my ill-tempered rant a while back on why I wasn’t invited: the format is so obviously based on large scale presentations they would have had few opportunities for lesser lights to present. I was expecting something like an academic conference with multiple sessions running simultaneously. So apologies. I will get more active in the local Melbourne Atheist, Freethinker, and Skeptical community over the next little while.

For the moment, enjoy this (click through for the rest of the comic):

Dilbert explains why CEO pay is a scam

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The dangers of walking

I have long said that exercise is dangerous: that 100% of all those I know who are physically active injure themselves. But I never expected that just frigging walking could be so problematic and fraught with danger!

I was on my way to meet some folk for lunch (Lygon Street, Carlton, a famed Melbourne eating place), when I stepped in a slight depression on the footpath and rolled my left ankle. This happens to me a lot, since I squashed my left foot in a motorcycle accident 30+ years ago, but I usually recover quickly. This time I didn’t.

As I fell I heard, and felt, a loud “snap” in my left knee, and by the time I hit the ground I was screaming in agony (worse than the accident above), Lovely bystanders came to my aid and one asked “Should we call an ambulance?” I didn’t hesitate for even a millisecond. “Yes!” I gasped in between sobs and screams (I am nothing if not expressive when it comes to pain. If I have to be in it, others must know that I am).

So, after five hours of morphine, x-rays and solicitous ER nurses, doctors, paramedics and radiographers, I discover that I have ruptured my anterior and medial cruciate ligaments, and the meniscus (did I get those names right? I can’t look it up now, as the morphine is making me very inattentive to detail).

Short story: I am now unable to walk for at least six weeks, and probably will never walk properly again. I can look forward to three years of rehab, and possible surgery.

This is a perfect outcome to cap off the last 18 months. I expect that my flat will be hit by a falling jet engine soon, and I won’t get the five foot scary rabbit first. Thought you all should know why I am going to be very bloody grumpy over the next little while.

Update: Pix!

IMG 0173

On the day

IMG 0174

This morning (with the pressure bandage leaving ribbing marks).

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Myersmeme

Link

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The Knight’s Song, or What is a [scientific] theory?

“Or else it doesn’t, you know. The name of the song is called ‘Haddocks’ Eyes.’”
“Oh, that’s the name of the song, is it?” Alice said, trying to feel interested.
“No, you don’t understand,” the Knight said, looking a little vexed. “That’s what the name is called. The name really is ‘The Aged Aged Man.’”
“Then I ought to have said ‘That’s what the song is called’?” Alice corrected herself.
“No, you oughtn’t: that’s quite another thing! The song is called ‘Ways and Means’: but that’s only what it’s called, you know!”
“Well, what is the song, then?” said Alice, who was by this time completely bewildered.
“I was coming to that,” the Knight said. “The song really is ‘A-sitting on a Gate’: and the tune’s my own invention.”
[Through the Looking-Glass, chapter 8]

Few words carry the weight that the Greek word theoria carries today. It is a word that applies to everything from politics to philosophy to mathematics, art, economics, psychology and of course, the natural sciences. Usually contrasted to another Greek word praxis, meaning practice or doing, it is the mental view one has of some aspect of the world. Beyond that, there is almost nothing in common with all uses of the term, especially now that it has been extended to apply to all of our general dispositions to observe and learn.

It comes as something of a surprise to me that the philosophy of science does not have a neat discussion I can locate of what counts as a theory in science. There are two general metalevel views – the traditional or “syntactic” notion and a structural or “semantic” notion – but these do not tell us what theories are, only what they entail in a more general philosophical sense. The syntactic notion holds that theories are logical theorems and their derivations, while the semantic view holds that theories are models that have real world interpretations. The slogan for the semantic view is

SEM: A theory is a collection of models (cf. McEwan unpublished)

There seems not to be an equivalent slogan for the syntactic view, but we can invent one:

SYN: A theory is an axiomatic system in some formal language

However, neither of these slogans make clear either what the difference between the two actually is, or what scientific theories, the things scientists take themselves to be using, making and testing, are. Instead we are dealing with logical objects – sentences, sets, classes and axioms. This is a dispute between philosophers (indeed, between schools of philosophy, the logical positivists supposedly holding SYN, following Carnap, and the post-positivists holding SEM (two originators of this view are Frederick Suppe and Bas van Fraassen).

SEM is about “model-theoretic models”, which is to say “an interpretation which satisfies some set of sentences (or sentential formulae). An interpretation specifies a set of individuals (the domain or universe of discourse) and defines of all the appropriate symbols (i.e., constant, function and predicate symbols) of the language on that set” (McEwan). SYN is a set of sentences in a formal (that is a logico-mathematical) language. Very roughly, a SEM theory is a structural representation of the world, while a SYN theory is a set of formal statements, each of which has some truth value. Both of these are highly abstract objects.

At the other end of the scale, we find scientists talking about theories as laws, prediction techniques, intellectual schemes, descriptions (sometimes) and even extended hypotheses. The Folk, on the other hand, treat “theory” as a special kind of guess. Creationists and other dissemblers regarding some science or other they object to play very strongly on these ambiguities and polysemies.

So I am left to wonder what a theory is (as opposed to how philosophers explicate theories in philosophy). We can consider a few senses for a theory in some domain of investigation:

  • The Mathematical Sense: A theory is some class of mathematical axioms and all their formal implications. This is sometimes called the axiomatic sense of theory – a theory, the real thing, is a class of mathematical theorems taken to be axioms.
  • The Interpretation Sense: A theory is a set of mathematical statements or structures together with rules for interpreting those statements.  If you have a mathematical equation that purports to describe how things fall, you need to know what to interpret the variables in that equation as referring to.
  • The Representation Sense: A theory is a description of the way things are in some domain. It allows the theorist to explain, predict, and manipulate those things.
  • The Worldview Sense: A theory is the set of beliefs that enables the theorist to engage with the world, structuring observation, action, reasoning and expression. This is effectively Thomas Kuhn’s notion of a “paradigm” or his later explication “exemplar”, some conceptual scheme that guides everything in the discipline.
  • The Practical Sense: It seems a bit odd to call a theory “practical” when it is usually contrasted with practice (praxis), but in this sense a theory is the set of conceptual commitments that the theorist employs to do things in the domain. So having a theory enables one to identify the relevant objects under study.
  • The Causal Sense: A theory is an explanation in terms of the causes of objects in the domain

Each of these senses appeals to some intellectual activity or state, but they vary greatly: the mathematical and interpretation senses involve mathematical equations or statements, the representation and worldview senses appeal to linguistic objects such as statements, sentences or logical formulae. The worldview and practical senses involve action-guiding stances. The causal sense is common but not universal. At best we can say they all involve beliefs (in the sense of mental stances, not faith statements necessarily). Of course, an actual theory may exhibit many or even all of these senses.

When we look at actual theories, they typically involve formal models – equations, simulations, algorithms – but this is not true of some older theories prior to the flowering of mathematisation of all science. It is also often not true of theories in domains that lack well-elaborated accounts. For example, theories in psychology are often verbal. Darwin’s theories (I count seven of them) were not mathematical at all, although he clearly intended them to be filled out later (as they were, apart from his theory of heredity). Freud’s theories remain unmathematised. So it doesn’t follow that for something to be a theory, it must be a mathematical structure, even if the philosophical analysis of theories develops a mathematical view. The reason is that “theory” in philosophy is a different beast to “theory” in science, and the relation is more like the relation between “concept” in philosophy and my concept of a television, for example.

So we might entertain the heresy that there is actually no “natural kind” in science that answers to “theory”, or, if you like, there’s no such thing as a theory, just lots of individual and particular intellectual constructs that get called theories. P. D. Magnus has argued that the term “theory” is a “family resemblance predicate” in which there are multiple meanings that overlap and cluster, but which have no necessary and sufficient definienda for all theories (Magnus unpublished), in an analogy with my favourite term of science, “species”. I think that this is correct, but I would go one further, and say that “theory” (unlike “species”) is a term that lacks any substantial meaning in science, and is really an assertion of the sociological status that some ideas have attained in a discipline, which can be for programmatic, political, or educational reasons as well as explanatory. A good theory will exhibit the majority of the cluster properties, but it doesn’t follow that theory is a category that stands alone, as it were, from the psychological, historical and social aspects of science.

What gets called a theory depends on no unique set of inherent properties of the theories themselves. This has some deep implications for thinking about science, if correct. Let’s consider some of them: the scientific process, domain specificity, and theory-dependence of observation.

The scientific process

Scientists are introduced to their disciplines in various ways, but nearly all of them are taught at some point that there is a scientific method. This methodism is, however, itself indefinable. Some accounts introduce a cycle of conjecture, testing, formulation, further  testing and then publication as a law or generalisation. Others focus on the use of statistical adequacy. Yet others make consilience (abductive reasoning) a key virtue – many lines of investigation must coincide.

Nearly all of them work on conceptual elements: statements in ordinary, formal or mathematical languages. Some domains or disciplines are more formalisable than others, but independently of this, scientists work with “hypotheses”, which, when sufficiently well established, become “theories”. In short, a theory is what a hypothesis wants to be when it grows up.

If there is no common property for theories, apart from properties held by things that aren’t theories by any estimation, then this picture of science, while not false, is misleading. There can be no singular method, because there is no singular destination for scientific ideas (see Magnus’ paper for a good discussion about what count as scientific ideas). And as famously expressed by Feyerabend:

It is clear, then, that the idea of a fixed method, or of a fixed theory of rationality, rests on too naive a view of man and his social surroundings. To those who look at the rich material provided by history, and who are not intent on impoverishing it in order to please their lower instincts, their craving for intellectual security in the form of clarity, precision, ‘objectivity’, ‘truth’, it will become clear that there is only one principle that can be defended under all circumstances and in all stages of human development. It is the principle: anything goes. [Against Method pp27-28]

If there are no essential features for theories, then there are no essential methods for attaining them. On the other hand, I think that the simple view that anything is or can be science is equally mistaken. Feyerabend did not actually argue that anything goes, but instead that there is no fixed method; this is a reductio. He knew perfectly well that disciplines have canon of reasoning and methods, and that some methods are inadequate or unfruitful (no aid and comfort to creationists in this argument, at any rate).

Domain specificity

One assumption often made about science is that it is divided into fields of inquiry that are themselves more or less natural. We think, for example, of biology as a natural subset of natural processes where we do not think of medicine that way (because medicine uses techniques and ideas that also apply to veterinary science). One standard view about domains in science is that they are effectively defined by the best attested theory of the phenomena in the domain. As theories develop, and as some parts of a domain are explained by theories in other domains, the scope of the domain is refined and revised (consider how much biology has been relegated to organic chemistry, or psychology to neurobiology).

If, however, we find that there are no such privileged conceptual constructs as theories, what does this mean for domains? How do we anchor domains (like biology) in natural ways? We can always give institutional arguments for domains, like saying that there is a Biology faculty in universities, or a course of educational requirements in schools. Or we can argue that it is easier to teach techniques when bundled together (microscopy, field observation, etc.) but it may just as easily have turned out a different way. Arguments about “what is “life”, for example, presuppose the naturalness of that domain (as do the NASA attempts to locate evidence of “life” elsewhere than earth), but if there is nothing that ties life together but human practical considerations and a collection of theories that are not entirely connected or commensurate, why bother? Why not just further divide the domains into groupings that are natural? Why, for example, does biology consider both evolution by natural selection and biochemistry, the Krebs cycle and ecology, behaviour and biogeography?

Attempts to formulate ontologies of domains also typically derive from the theoretical commitments of the domain (atoms are part of the domain of physics, while pain sensations aren’t); so if the theoretical commitments are sui generis to the domain because the nature of “theory” in that domain is unique also, we have a problem of ontological relativity, which may or may not be a problem, depending on how you think ontologies should be handled.

This is, in effect, an argument for a descriptive pluralism. Pluralisms are often thought of as some kind of failure or postmodern relativism, but I see them rather differently. We start our investigations of things based on the phenomena that present themselves to our inspection. Since we have prior sensory, social and conceptual commitments which may or may not be reliable guides to the structure of the world, we very often have to revise our concepts to fit what we learn by investigation. So, “fish” no longer means any thing that lives in water and moves of its own accord, and humans are now apes. Pluralism is a necessary aspect of discovering that the world wasn’t structured the way we naively thought it was. It is a recognition that words matter less than the world they describe.

But this indicates something about science that is so obvious as to almost not need saying: evidence – observation, measurement and experiment – takes priority over theory. That is perhaps a dumb thing to say, or perhaps it is so dangerous as to be obviously false, depending on what you think about our ways of knowing and explaining (theoretical constructionists would take the latter tack). But I think that theories, and domains demarcated by theories, are definable solely in terms of their being something other than evidence. In short, a theory is what evidence isn’t. That leads naturally to the next point.

Theory dependence of observation revisited

I have previously discussed the “theory-dependence of observation thesis (TDOT)” in detail, so I will be brief. If theory itself is not a natural kind, the claim that observation relies upon it falters. Of course our conceptual furniture affects how we observe – this follows from the mere existence of trained observers – but the nonexistence of Theory (that is, as a natural kind) means that the sting of the TDOT is largely removed. It resolves down to the view that we observe things that we have learned to observe. This is not, I think, so deep as the TDOT5 claim defended by Kuhnians at one time. It certainly does not license the sorts of claims that are sometimes made that science is a self-contained hermeneutic bubble just like any other world view.

Conclusion

I think this is significant in part because it helps up to understand how science really proceeds. The notion of “law” in science has been deprecated recently amongst philosophers (e.g., Cartwright et al. 2005); it is time to deprecate “theory” also.

It also means that what we call a theory and how we talk about the notion of theory is not unlike the Knight’s song. We often refer to philosophical accounts of representation, explanation and formalisation when we discuss “theory” (excluding the terminological arguments amongst other philosophical traditions, like Marxist or phenomenological schools) when we should be talking about the ways scientists use the terms, and then, and only then, consider the philosophical implications. And if “theory” lacks the sort of reality it is sometimes held to have, if it simply is whatever in science is not evidentiary or probative, then we should be more empiricist in our philosophy.

I take this line, of course, to defend the claim that one thing science often does is, independently of theory, classify the world as a way to investigate it. If theory is not a natural kind, then it becomes clear that we can do this, only what we rely upon, our conceptual commitments that make a trained observer a better systematist, is more complex than “theory” suggests it would be.

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Book proposal call

I’m on the editorial board of the Species and Systematics series at the University of California Press, and so if any of you have a proposal for that series, on any topic relating to these two areas that is academic and specialist, let me, series editor Malte Ebach, or the editor at UCP, Chuck Crumly, know. We’re looking for books now! This isn’t a philosophy series, though; rather it’s a science series that happened once to publish a history (i.e., mine).

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Evolution Quotes: Twain on inference about the past

Now, if I wanted to be one of those ponderous scientific people, and “let on” to prove what had occurred in the remote past by what had occurred in a given time in the recent past, or what will occur in the far future by what has occurred in late years, what an opportunity is here! Geology never had such a chance, nor such exact data to argue from! Nor “development of species,” either! Glacial epochs are great things, but they are vague—vague. Please observe:—

In the space of one hundred and seventy-six years the Lower Mississippi has shortened itself two hundred and forty-two miles. That is an average of a trifle over one mile and a third per year. Therefore, any calm person, who is not blind or idiotic, can see that in the old Oölitic Silurian period, just a million years ago next November, the Lower Mississippi River was upwards of one million three hundred thousand miles long, and stuck out over the Gulf of Mexico like a fishing rod. And by the same token any person can see that seven hundred and forty-two years from now the Lower Mississippi will be only a mile and three quarters long, and Cairo and New Orleans will have joined their sidewalks and be plodding comfortably along under a single mayor and a mutual board of aldermen. There is something fascinating about science. One gets such wholesale returns of conjecture out of such a trifling investment of fact.

[Mark Twain, Life on the Mississippi, chapter 17, p208, Boston: James R. Osgood & Co., 1883]

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Bayes, evolutionary clocks, and biogeography

I just received a review by Gareth Nelson of Michael Heads’ book Molecular Panbiogeography of the Tropics (publishers’ site). I should have blogged this before, since I got a copy, being on the editorial board for this series (the same one I published with at Uni Calif Press), but I have been bogged down with personal troubles and other tasks. Also, I am not professionally competent to make much comment, so Gary’s review, forthcoming in Systematic Biology, is welcome.

However, the book and the review set me thinking about how historical inferences in biology are made. We use dating to establish how evolution occurred – whether, for example, a particular species is the ancestor of another, or when a particular trait evolved. These inferences are ubiquitous and somewhat doctrinaire. But there is even a website and app (TimeTree) that uses techniques like molecular clocks to absolutely date divergence times, and which draws inferences from it (such as that a particular species is not an ancestral species because it is found too late or too early). Molecular clocks are not so reliable as is sometimes presumed, however. Gary quotes this episode:

Here I am reminded of a scientific meeting in London (5 September 2001; published by Donoghue & Smith 2003). Francisco Ayala presented a paper on “Molecular clocks: whence and whither?” An audience member then asked: “Francisco, is there a molecular clock”? He gave a complex reply. The same member asked again: “Francisco, is there a molecular clock?” This time he gave a one-word answer: “No.”

Stratigraphy is another example. The earliest date given for a species in the fossil record is usually the date of the oldest specimen found, but as a well known book, Systematics and the Fossil Record, notes, species may persist well outside of that record (“Lazarus taxa“), or be misidentified as persisting when they haven’t (giving rise to “Elvis taxa“, my favourite technical term). At best we have relative dates, with some degree of credence in the absolute dates, and little if any direct knowledge of the path of actual evolution.

This sets up a problem or two. One of these is the problem of calibration: how do we match these relative dates with absolute time? Heads’ solution is to use plate tectonics:

The method of dating used in this book does not assume an evolutionary clock, even a relaxed one. Instead it fits multiple tectonic events (rather than multiple fossils) to a phylogeny. This indicates a chronology in which rates can show extreme changes within and among lineages and genes at different times and places. [p71]

Gary notes that this gives us at best a minimum age, and he and Heads both dispute that this will give us confidence in a maximum age of taxa. And he and Heads both note the problems with the “dispersal” method (or as it is better called in my view, a “presumption”) in trying to find the centres of origin, both in time and space, of taxa, instead adopting the “vicariance” method (“presumption”) in which the known distribution of taxa gives the “tracks” of a taxon, along which the origin may be said to be, either some location or across the whole track. Given the recent work on human origins and the multiple dispersal model interbreeding claims with existing species in Asia and Europe, this is a present concern.

I leave readers to find Gary’s review and read it, and then to read at least the first two introductory discussion chapters in Heads’ book (which at nearly 100 pages is almost a book in itself). Right now, however, I want to make a point about historical inference in the natural sciences (and indeed in any domain). One of the besetting issues in the philosophy of history is “historicism”, which is the view that we know the natures of things when we know their origins. This is reflected in the title of a book, The Poverty of Historicism by Karl Popper. It is regarded by historians as a sin, along the lines of Whiggism and the Great Man theory.

In this context we might ask whether we indeed do know biological taxa from knowing their origins at all. It seems to many that biological taxa are known independently of the explanations and origin stories given in evolutionary contexts; for example the discovery that the Leopard Frog (Rana pipiens) was several species was based, not on evolutionary considerations but on a knowledge of how frogs made mating calls. Evolution provided the explanation after that discovery.

But the temptation towards historicism is inevitable (Ankersmit 2010); we do think things are known by their origins, for all that this is a fallacy of reasoning (the so-called genetic fallacy). And even more than that, we insist upon trying to find these origins, in time and space, and nowhere more than in evolutionary biology. In fact, one of the modern philosophical views on what species are relies entirely upon their origins (Griffiths’ 1999 historical essentialist account).

Here’s the problem I have here, and it is one that was raised many times in the history of post-evolutionary biology, in particular by the so-called Pattern Cladists (e.g., Nelson and Platnick 1981): if we do not know the history, how can we evaluate claims made based on the evolutionary process? That is, if we don’t already know how evolution in general proceeds (such as assumptions of molecular clocks or rates of change), how do we evaluate the claim that a particular lineage evolved in the absence of direct evidence? And how do we learn how evolution proceeds in the first place?

This circularity can be called the Creationist Objection, in a rather restricted sense: not that evolution does not happen, but that we do not know how it happens directly, but have to rely upon a “methodological creationism” (a term of Paul Griffiths’), in which the evidence takes priority over inferences, and in which inferences cannot be used as evidence. It’s an ironic take on the common creationist objection to anything that contradicts the account of Genesis: “were you there?” [Answer: well yes, in the relevant sense – observation – we were there.]

The Creationist Objection is based on an extreme empiricism; the view that evidence is only measurement and observation. Consequently, assumptions of molecular clocks is not evidence (but radioactive decay rates are, because they are fundamental laws of nature, and this argument applies only to historical observations). It is my view that the historicism of modern evolutionary biology is based on the faulty assumption that we can treat some prior hypotheses as Bayesian priors to estimate the likelihoods of some process occurring and evaluate claims of origins.

Now Bayesianism is a well-established theory of knowledge, and in one sense we are all Bayesians now, but that doesn’t imply we are actually using Bayes theorem; just that we know that we can’t make most inferences without assuming some prior hypotheses and likelihoods. However, when we do that, we are hostages to the correctness of those prior estimates. If we screw them up, all our subsequent reasoning will also screw up. So evidence should always trump our priors, and we need to do a kind of reality check from time to time, which is why Heads’ approach has merit; tectonics is a distinct domain from biology, and so the assumptions are relatively independent of our biases of evolutionary theory and narratives.

I once asked Gary, as a callow youth (well, I was still just a doctoral student; I was aged even then), whether he thought we could get some idea of ancestors, a question motivated by the refrain among some pattern cladists that ancestors are unknowable, and his answer surprised me. He replied that it was something we could have various degrees of confidence in, but yes. We could know ancestors just to the extent that we had evidence of various kinds. I recall thinking this was a kind of consilience view. It’s just that we cannot observe ancestors, and so from a purely empirical perspective, one has to represent them as “sister taxa” to their putative descendants in a cladogram. Today this is universally understood (although at no time have the process cladists conceded that they agree with the pattern cladists now, so far as I know). The question is not how we represent them or what the evidence actually indicates, but how we take evidence to guide inference.

Back in the 18th century, naturalists often debated what counted as “scientific reasoning” and many of them followed Lockean principles that knowledge is only ever got from observation, through the senses. This extreme empiricism led rather directly to positivism, and thence to logical positivism. The alternative view is something one might call a kind of Kantianism: one can only observe in the light of some theory. Empiricism and Kantianism are ever at war in the philosophy of science, and in science itself.

Depending on what you require of inference, either we cannot know ancestors, events and centres of origin in the past, or we certainly (or almost certainly) do know these things although we have yet to uncover some events. Or, you are somewhere in the middle there. This mediate view is a more common position than the rhetoric of the debate might indicate. Generally in science, when one side makes claims at one extreme and their opponents take the other extreme, you can get them to qualify and qualify until they approach each other in the middle and only words separate them (a point once made by Stephen Toulmin in 1970). Most pattern cladists and panbiogeographers will admit that you can at least estimate the ancestors and origins; most evolutionary biologists and dispersalist biogeographers will admit that no, we don’t know for sure, but that these are our best guesses. Almost nobody is either a true methodological creationist or darwinian fundamentalist.

And this is how it ought to be; science is about warrantable inferences, not doctrine. However, loose talk sinks inferences. We often assume that what we hypothesise is what we actually know, when instead we are multiplying uncertainty upon uncertainty, a problem with Bayesian inference. And yet… Bayes rules. It works well. We manage to navigate the world by assuming that what we hypothesise is true, so unless the world is simply bizarre and perverse, something about it must be right.

I think that the solution is to presume there is no solution. Both approaches – Locke and Kant – are necessary in a population of scientists to ensure both that neither the opposition to theory so common in the 18th century nor the total theory-dependence of various language-centric philosophies is in control of science, as neither is sufficient for science to proceed. We do different things when we observe than when we make inferences based on hypotheses. The only problem arises when we confuse and conflate these two things. Theories are not evidence, and evidence is not explanation.

The temptation of historicism is a kind of Kantianism, but Kant was not wrong, merely incomplete. Science requires that we are both empiricists ands theorists and that neither is dispensed with, nor takes on the role of the other in inference. The origins of species and traits in evolution are interesting topics, and we should try to work them out. But not by ignoring or trimming evidence.

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The decline of Australian progressivism

Australian state Queensland had an election yesterday, and the result went from a Labor government to a virtual elimination of Labor in the state parliament. This follows, and exceeds, similar defeats in New South Wales last year, and Victoria the year before. Each year, the defeats increase. Victoria went from a 13 seat majority for Labor to a 13 seat majority for the conservative coalition on a nearly 6% swing. New South Wales was, at the time, the biggest swing in Australian history, with the coalition gaining 69 seats in a landslide on a 16.48% swing, with Labor reduced from 52 to 20 seats. Last night, Queensland had seen around a 14.5% swing, and Labor is reduced from 51 to 7 seats.

The usual wisdom here is that Labor is tired, or that it has sold off public assets, or broken promises, but I think the real problem is that lately Labor in Australia has played politics for the sole purpose of holding power and giving cronies plum positions. The party is closely tied to the union movement, and most politicians in the party rose through the ranks of union representatives or functionaries. In the past when cronyism has been seen openly in politics, Australians will vote against it, as Queensland showed in the 1980s.

The trouble is that the opposite side, the conservatives, are no better, so the choice seems to be between those whose cronies are big unions, or those whose cronies are big business. The problem Australia faces is that this has been normalised, largely through the influence of the Murdoch media, so that a common refrain by pundits is that a vote for parties like the Greens are considered a “wasted vote”, which is literally false given Australia’s system of preferential voting.

There are alternatives on the political scene: the Greens are one, although I would say that there is not one but two Green parties, one that is largely progressive in its social policy, and one that seeks to paternalistically control social morés and is driven by an antipathy to any science that happens to contradict their favoured dogmas. There is the unfortunately named “Sex Party” that promotes a properly liberal, in the sense of John Stuart Mill, social agenda. I suggested to the leader that their slogan should be “governance for grownups”. Unfortunately, although it is the fourth most voted party federally, legal restrictions in New South Wales mean they cannot register as a political party there, and so they do not show up on the political reporting radar (and so they are not mentioned).

So long as the media insist Australia is a two party state, there will be strong pressure for each party to converge in behaviour and policies, and the only choice is whether one supports a corrupt labor movement or a corrupt capitalist class. Democracy is effectively stage managed and so merely the acting of free choice on a stage decorated by those with power already.

Issues like gay marriage and personal freedom from police action where no crime has been shown, and so forth are regarded as side issues by this economically obsessed media and political class. But such issues are what makes democracy worthwhile. Any society can run an oligarchy; the issue is whether social attitudes drive or are driven by oligarchs.

I urge my Australian readers to vote Anything But The Two Parties in all subsequent elections. Use your preferences to decide which of the two Oligarchy Parties is least offensive, but if enough Australians vote for a truly progressive candidate or party, things will change, and change rapidly, a rather than waiting another two generations for the current Gilded Age to subside.

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What warrant is there for belief in God?

Every morning on the way to the campus of the University of Melbourne I pass by the United Faculty of Theology, and I often wish that someone would come out and engage me in a debate. Partly because I am an ornery fellow who loves a good stoush, but also because I am genuinely puzzled by religious belief. Recently two things happened: one was that I had a series of discussions about Alvin Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN; which is in effect the claim that if we believe that evolution is true, we should not believe that atheism is true). I ended up arguing that in fact Darwinian thinking should lead us to deny that any supernaturalism is something we can reasonably be expected to have evolved to know reliably.

Earlier this week, in a class on argument mapping, I encountered (actually, I proffered it for analysis) an argument of C. S. Lewis’ much beloved of many apologists:

Creatures are not born with desires unless satisfaction for those desires exists. A baby feels hunger: well, there is such a thing as food. . . If I find in myself a desire which no experience in this world can satisfy, the most probable explanation is that I was made for another world. [Mere Christianity, Bk. III, chap. 10, “Hope”]

Now I was born with a desire to be Superman or something like him, so I presume that means there is some world which I am made to be Superman in (thus proving the existence of multiple worlds; another Lewis, David Lewis, would have been pleased). It is a not terribly sensible argument, and it presents what I think is the sole and only warrant for believing in God or gods or the supernatural: wish fulfilment.

This term is taken from Freud, but I don’t mean by it what he meant by it. I mean simply this: humans are disposed to think the world will behave the way they want it to; that their desires have some causal power beyond what they can make their limbs and mouth do. If I want there to be a God, then there has to be a God. Once you adopt that belief, you have to explain it, which is what Lewis’ argument from desire (I would call it an argument to satisfaction) attempts to do. It is precisely backwards.

Both Plantinga’s and Lewis’ arguments rely upon the state of our beliefs having some influence on how the world is, rather than being the other way around. Plantinga’s EAAN moves from “we did not evolve to know that the supernatural does not exist” to “we cannot know that the supernatural does not exist” and to an implied “the supernatural exists”. Lewis’ argument moves from “I desire something this world cannot satisfy” to “there is another world in which I can satisfy that desire”. Both move from “I have some cognitive state” to “this is evidence the world is as my state intends”. Let us call this the intentional argument strategy.

If wishes, however, were horses (or more fashionably, Ducatis), then beggars would ride. However much we may desire that the world is some way, like desiring there to be life after death, if there is no independent evidence for that belief, we are not warranted in believing it. Our beliefs should follow the evidence, not act as evidence for their content (unless, of course, the content is that we have those beliefs). This is not restricted to religion. Many scientists think that their theories are evidence for the truth of their theories, and many philosophers think the same. But if the world is not teleological, and we are not “made for” anything, then we do not have warrant for these beliefs.

So what reason is there for believing in a religious claim? Why did Lewis come to believe in Christianity, and not, say, Shinto or African animism or Makiritare traditions? Did he consider each of these in turn and reject all but Christianity? Why is it that adherents convert to religions that are culturally influential, if they are warranted beliefs? The answer is that the warrant is cultural, that people turn to those traditions they see around them and which they are taught are acceptable options, most of the time. The reason why people are Christians is, to a first approximation, because that is their native tradition. The reason why some other religions have influence is because there are those promoting them culturally.

In the absence of arguments that are decisive in warranting belief, and let’s face it, none have ever been raised that survived critical examination, the sole reason people adopt a belief is that it suits them to do so. Either it has cultural advantages or it serves their psychological disposition to believe it, if these are not the same motivation. One would be a lot more impressed by such arguments from intention if there were not such a strong correlation between the traditions one was exposed to as a young person and the traditions selected in later life. Had Lewis become Shinto, I might think his reasoning was more independent of what he wanted to believe.

A preacher once unironically said this:

Things and actions are what they are, and consequences of them will be what they will be: why then should we desire to be deceived? [Bishop Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons, Sermon VII, §16.]

Butler was arguing that evil deeds are evil no matter how we would prefer they are guiltless or that we might become guiltless. It’s a good point. It applies also to there being a God. Things are as they are, and no amount of wishing they were otherwise will aid us. We know that, brains in a vat and other kinds of radical skepticism notwithstanding, we have warrant for believing in the world about us. This, if anything is warranted belief, is warranted. Belief in anything other than the observed, experienced and physical world is not. I am not saying that one is irrational if one does believe in non-physical realities so long as that doesn’t commit you to believing in false facts about the physical world, but the beliefs are just beliefs. They carry no weight.

People who are committed to this fallacious inference from intentionality often wish to claim that the reality around us is constructed. We are “worldmakers” as philosopher Nelson Goodman put it. Well I do not think that we are such world makers that we can reasonably deny the primacy of the world we actually experience. To take that step is to abandon the idea of warrantable belief entirely. Think what you like about gods, but deny that there’s a table in front of me now, and I will doubt your ability to believe anything based on warrant. Warrantable beliefs must be reasonable and evidential. If you deny evidence altogether, then we can have no sensible conversation.

If in thinking that evolution gives us no reason to believe in the external world, one thinks this means we cannot deny the supernatural, unexperienced, world, something has gone very very wrong in the argument. The notion of warrant has lost its flavour and is now just over-used chewing gum for the philosophical palette. Stick it under the table, and get something fresh. The intentional argument strategy is the strategy of the juvenile.

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