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There is a religion which oppresses women, which is enthusiastically adopted by marginalised groups, which hates democracy and which has declared the modern world to be a heresy they call “Americanism”. This religion, which is run entirely by men, demands of its adherents loyalty to a small group of clerics overseas, in a pseudostate set up by extremists. Its doctrine, to be sure, is hardly consistently adopted by many of its followers who have adapted to democratic civil society, but taken at face value that doctrine requires a theocracy imposed upon all who live under its rule. It has underlain many wars and atrocities, and collaborates with dictatorial states so long as they support its interests, although it has been known to turn on them too, when the chance arises.

Adherents of this religion are often accused of being terrorists and disloyal to their home nation. They are said to follow a legal system that they put above the laws of the land, and to undertake religious wars in the name of justice. Secularists have often attacked this religion in the name of modern society, and egalitarianism, which this religion opposes. It has generally rejected attempts at cross religious dialogue or tolerance for nonbelievers. It opposes secular education, and has set up schools run by clerics and religious authorities to ensure that its next generation is unaware of alternative views. It has media figures that attack everything they hate and wish to impose their views upon those who are not part of its society.

Clerics in this religion attack socially progressive viewpoints and proponents as going against the will of God, and insist that the only way to live is theirs, and so they justify horrible atrocities like killing Jews, stealing children, and prohibiting medical treatment of various kinds because it offends them as a way to “make the world just”.

What is this religion? It is Catholicism.

Any student of recent history (for a historian, the last 200 years are recent) knows these things about Catholicism. As recently as my childhood (granted, that is a long time ago in dog years) people were declaiming that the Catholics would outbreed us all (us being Protestants, and in my suburb, Anglicans and Presbyterians) and throwing stones at their children.

Ask yourself, gentle reader: do you fear the coming Catholic takeover of your democratic society? Sure, the various popes and archbishops (and one cardinal in particular) say fundamentally indecent things about how the rights and welfare of women and children are to be subordinated to the interests and dogmas of the Church, and if they had half a chance they’d block abortion even in life or death situations for mothers, but secular societies have forced the rank and file to accept that they are not in charge, and that they must live by the laws and mores of a modern society. Most Catholics in western societies even think contraception is acceptable, and more than half agree divorce and abortion are okay as well.

So why don’t we scream in the streets that Catholics are a threat to our values, way of life, and safety? Because they have changed how they live, and in the process, changed their religion as well. In the short space of a century (and believe me, in the lifetime of a religion, that is very short indeed) we have gone from the Catholic Church arrogating to itself the role of theocratic arbiter of what is right in every country to it being one among a plurality of religions, viewpoints and ways of life. More remains to be done, but it happens.

The same thing will happen with Islam. Indeed, Muslims have been enthusiastic adopters of secularism in many countries (pre-revolution Iran, pre-Erdogan Turkey, Indonesia) already. Most of the extremists are from the countryside, and rural peasants always are more conservative than urbanites, no matter what the nation, ethnicity or religion. But there’s another concern here: the sacrificial lamb, to use a religious metaphor.

Jews know this. They were used to justify every grab for power and money from Richard II to Hitler, and to denigrate every nation from Spain to America. They were a nice distraction from the real issues facing a political elite. Problems with the economy? The Jews. Problems with employment? The Jews. Terrorist acts by (in recent years) Muslims? The Jews set it up.

Muslims have a large number of extremists, to be sure, among their ranks. I suspect, however, this has more to do with dislocation, dispossession and marginalisation than it does with the admittedly awful doctrines of Islam, just as it did with Catholics before them. Dislocate, dispossess and marginalise any group at all, and they will become extremists. Workers in Europe before the Third Reich were the same (and unions were a convenient whipping boy for the Nazis also, as they are in rapaciously capitalist America). Kick a group long enough and it will try to kick back.

I have personally known many urbane, sophisticated, secular and science-based Muslims, working at a medical research institute for a decade. They came from the Arabian peninsula, from Pakistan, Turkey and other nations. All that mattered for them to be medical researchers was that they adopted the science. Likewise, all that matters for a Muslim to be a good citizen of a secular democratic nation is that they adopt our laws, civic values and practices. And they are. But marginalise them, exclude them from public discourse, and take away their citizenship, and you get what you should expect.

Thanks to the generosity of three donors – Neil, James and Ben – I have enough to pay the rent on this place. Now I have to do some writing. Problem is I’m time poor, so I thought I’d write up some of my lecture notes as posts. Expect some stuff on the idea of nature, and maybe some other lectures.

I am also thinking of a series on sexual ethics and relationships. It may be rather different to the previous posts. Let me know what you think.

Again, thanks to the donors. They are all friends, and their and others’ kind words encourage me greatly.

I know I have been remiss in not updating ET for a while. I am working in a very hard boring (lowly paid) job and my mind is not roaming as far as it used to right now.

However, the fees for the domain and hosting are due, and I cannot make them, so it may cease to be anyway. If you find it no longer there, that will be why. My apologies.

The principle upon which I understand the Natural System of Botany to be founded is, that the affinities of plants may be determined by a consideration of all the points of resemblance between their various parts, properties, and qualities; that thence an arrangement may be deduced in which those species will be placed next each other which have the greatest degree of relationship; and that consequently the quality or structure of an imperfectly known plant may be determined by those of another which is well known. Hence arises its superiority over arbitrary or artificial systems, such as that of Linnaeus, in which there is no combination of ideas, but which are mere collections of isolated facts, not having any distinct relation to each other.

This is the only intelligible meaning that can be attached to the term, Natural System, of which Nature herself, who creates species only, knows nothing. Our genera, orders, classes, and the like, are mere contrivances to facilitate the arrangement of our ideas with regard to species. A genus, order, or class, is therefore called natural, not because it exists in Nature, but because it comprehends species naturally resembling each other more than they resemble any thing else.
The advantages of such a system, in applying Botany to useful purposes, are immense, especially to medical men, with whole profession the science has always been identified. A knowledge of the properties of one plant is a guide to the practitioner, which enables him to substitute with confidence some other that is naturally allied to it; and physicians, on foreign stations, may direct their inquiries, not empirically, but upon fixed principles, into the qualities of the medicinal plants which nature has provided in every region for the alleviation of the maladies peculiar to it. To horticulturists it is not less important: the propagation or cultivation of one plant is frequently applicable to all its kindred; the habits of one species in an order will often be those of the rest; many a gardener might have escaped the pain of a poisoned limb, had he been acquainted with Natural affinity; and, finally, the phenomena of grafting, that curious operation, which is one of the grand features of distinction between the animal and vegetable kingdoms, and the success of which is wholly controlled by ties of blood, can only be understood by the student of the Natural System. [John Lindley, A Natural System of Botany, Longman et al. 1836, viii]

This is almost exactly the justification of phylogenetic analyses, contrary to those who think that there is something else important about them, like history or technique.

In my last post I argued that physicalism cannot be rejected simply because people assert there are nonphysical objects which are beyond specification. Some are, however, specifiable, and one commentator has identified the obvious ones: abstract objects like the rules of chess or numbers. I have dealt with these before in my “Pizza reductionism” post, which I invite you to go read.

Done? OK, then; let us proceed.

It is often asserted that there are obviously things that are not physical, such as ideas, numbers, concepts, etc., quite apart from qualia, I once sat with a distinguished philosopher, who I respect greatly and so shall not name, when he asserted that we can construct natural classifications because we can deal first with the natural numbers. I asked him “In what sense are numbers natural objects?”, meaning, why should we think numbers are entities in the natural world. He admitted that the question had not occurred to him (I doubt that – he is rather smart), but that it was simply an axiom of his philosophy. I do not think such abstract objects are natural.

This applies to anything that is “informational”, including all semantic entities like meanings, symbols, lexical objects, and so on. They only “exist” as functional modalities in our thoughts and language. I have also argued this before: information does not “exist”; it is a function of how we process signals. Mathematics is not a domain, it is a language, and the reason it works is because the bits that seriously do not work are not explored far[*] – not all of it has to work in a physical or natural sense, but much of it has to, or else it becomes a simple game that we would not play so much.

So the question of the incoherence of physicalism is based on the assumption (which runs contrary to physicalism, and is thus question begging) that abstract objects are natural things. I don’t believe they are, and I certainly do not think that a thought, or concept, for example, which can be had by many minds and is therefore supposed to be located in none of them (and thus transcendental), really is nonphysical. That is another case of nouning language. The thought “that is red” exists, for a physicalist, in all the heads that meet the functional social criteria for ascriptions of red. It exists nowhere else – it just is all those cognitive and social behaviours in biological heads.

I’m riding roughly over some fine grained philosophical issues here, I know; but we don’t need to resolve these yet. It’s enough to say that the abstraction objection (which deserves initial capitals: Abstraction Objection to Physicalism, or AOP, because philosophers love acronyms even though it impedes communication) simply fails on the face of it, and needs a whole lot more work to make a prima facie objection. But because we privilege the mental, linguistic and formal (as philosophers) over the physical, it appears to have some probative (i.e., evidentiary) force in the debate. But this has never to my mind been shown.

By the way, the view of abstract objects I prefer is that of Ed Zalta, who defines an abstract object as an object that is not located in space or time. If physicalism is true, abstract objects are only concrete objects without the location indices. And since everything has a location index under physicalism (even if vaguely), abstract objects are fictions we find useful. Much of the supposed counter instances to physicalism are useful fictions, like corporate personhood.

In the first post I dealt with the qualitative objection (sorry, Qualitative Objection), and now I have discussed the Abstraction Objection. Are there other objections to deal with? Our commentators have given us one, at least: the Purpose Objection. As Nagel (and Fodor) have argued, a naturalistic (that is, a physicalist) world view seems to have no place for irreducible purposes, and in a way that is true. The notion that purpose is a natural property of the universe is definitely not a physical notion. And yet, they say, living things have purposes, and without purpose there is no explanation of how the incredibly rare facets of life, and indeed life itself, could evolve.

But this is an asinine objection, again begging the question – since there is an assumption of purpose in the universe, the interlocutor has already rejected physicalism. Instead we should only ask if there is the appearance of this natural purpose, and there are satisfactory accounts of that. We might say that purposes are determined by functional success. But this is not the Nagel-Fodor objection as such. Instead they find the very existence of selection processes and their outcomes unlikely to the point of miracle. I can understand they find this unlikely. But their own incredulity about physical processes leading to functional life and selection processes is based upon ignorance, as it is for those of us who find life and its processes very likely given the right circumstances – we simply do not know enough to estimate the likelihoods. After the fact, if life arose naturally (that is, physically), then the likelihood is one. But if we presume the likelihood is low, then the existence of life is a problem.

Do you see the trick? Assume that some directive purpose is necessary and you will find the natural existence of life unlikely, which you can then use to deprecate natural accounts of life. Again, it depends upon privileging something human – in this case, intelligent purpose – in order to find processes that do not privilege the human somehow deficient. This, by the way, underpins (and the fallacy undercuts) the argument from design used by intelligent design advocates.

To summarise this already long post (sorry): if we assume that symbols are abstract then any statement of physics is a counter instance to physicalism; but if we are physicalists, then we do not assume that symbols are not physical. Physicalism is coherent, but you might need to revise some of your untested assumptions. And chance and necessity can deliver outcomes that we presume must be the result of design, since we are designing entities. Again, we beg our question.

One final point about design and directed purpose: the mere having of a purpose in no way guarantees that the outcomes will match it. As someone once noted, the lion intends to eat the gazelle and the gazelle intends not to be eaten, and yet the process that results is one of natural selection, which is an unsupervised process. If wishes were horses, beggars would ride. The old saws cut best…

* Yes, I know mathematicians explore areas like group theory and spin glass and so on that later turn out to have practical implications. This should not surprise you. For a start, mathematics explores the implications of mathematics that does work, and also we mark it when bits of mathematics have applications. As Francis Bacon so rightly said, “Men mark it when they hit, but do not mark it when they miss”. In other words, the practicality of mathematics and all other logical formalisms is a Texas Target.

Every so often, we read about some philosopher or other form of public intellectual who makes the claim that a physicalist ontology – a world view in which only things that can be described in terms of physics are said to exist – is impoverished. That is, there are things whereof science cannot know, &c. A recent example is that made by Thomas Nagel [nicely eviscerated here by the physicist Sean Carroll], whose fame in philosophy rests with an influential 1974 paper that there is something like being a bat that no amount of physics, physiology or other objective science could account for.

Recent, Nagel has argued that the evolutionary view called (historically misleadingly) neo-Darwinism, is “almost certainly” false. One of the reasons is that “materialism” (which Nagel should know is an antiquated world view replaced by physicalism defined above; there are many non-material things in physics, not least fields of various kinds) does not permit a full account of consciousness; the subjective facts of being a particular individual organism. Another is that the chance that life would emerge from a lifeless universe is staggeringly unlikely. How this is calculated is somewhat mysterious, given that at best we only have (dare I say it?) subjective estimates anyway, but there it is.

But Nagel is not alone. Various nonreligious (apparently) thinkers have made similar assertions, although some, like Frank Jackson, who proposed the Knowledge Argument, have since backed down. What is it that physicalism must account for that these disputants and objectors say it cannot?

It almost entirely consists of consciousness, intentions, intelligence or some similar mental property which is entirely inexplicable by “reductionist” physicalism. [Reductionism is a term of abuse that means – so far as I can tell – solely that the person who makes such an accusation does not like the thing or persons being accused.] And that raises our question: is physicalism lacking something?

What I have been waiting for since I tricked independently upon a physicalist view aged 16 or so, is a reason to think that this is the case. What was once defined as irreducible (to physics), such as the fluidity or water or the ability to make abstract maps of the world and then to navigate it with some success, have been shown merely to be a matter of computational tractability, not logical or metaphysical impossibility.

Consciousness in particular strikes me as a ghostly strawperson. When one is asked to define consciousness, if it is done functionally, then we can understand that there are purely physical systems (including computers of some kind) that can replicate these functions. If it is done in terms of the subjective experience, then as I have argued before, even a digital camera has some degree of subjectivity. But if it is done in terms of ineffable experience, one has to ask why something that cannot be expressed clearly can act as a counterexample to states of affairs that can be expressed clearly and precisely.

Something that is inexpressible cannot exclude (or deny the completeness of) states of affairs that can be expressed. We may feel like there is a “what-it-is-like” to be conscious, but this alone doesn’t give us any reason to think that state is anything more than simply being conscious; in other words, of having a cognitive location, nature and capacity. What it is like to be a bat is just to be a bat; what it is like to be a human being is just to be a human being, and so on, right down to what it is like to be me (or any other individual) is simply to be that individual.

The ineffable states of consciousness, the qualia as they are called, strike me as a mistake of language. Once, Ludwig Wittgenstein noted that “Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our language.” (§ 109, Philosophical Investigations). Merely because we have such terms as “seems”, “feels” and phrases like “What-it-is-like” is no reason for us to conclude that there are seemings, (irreducible) feelings and qualia; to think so is to confuse verbs for nouns, or functional terms for ontologies. That we are conscious (that is, that we do things in a conscious fashion) is beyond reasonable doubt. That conscious behaviour implies Consciousness (the substance or ontologically irreducible state) is beyond credulity. We are being bewitched by our language.


One major consequence of taking our verbing language as nounish is that we then tend to privilege our consciousness as the primary state of the world. I don’t mean panpsychism, although that seems to me a prime example of this mistake, but the idea that the world we experience is a mere construct of our [language | mind | worldview | etc.], as if we make the world in which we live. This mistake is rife in post-Idealist philosophy, and is perhaps an error assigned to the early empiricists, who asserted that all we know and experience is the evidence of our senses, making our senses primary to the world being sensed. This is akin to making the letter primary to the letter-writer, and even the postman. It appears in the claim that if two people have very different worldviews they literally live in different worlds (a view ascribed with varying justice to Thomas Kuhn, Immanuel Kant, and even Wittgenstein himself).

Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other a fool and a heretic. [On Certainty, §611]

Kuhn’s idea of paradigm includes this mistake, and generations of philosophers have repeated it, as if all that two different scientists who hold theories that are not reconcilable held in common was that they had theories, and not (as Wittgenstein noted) a form of human life, a shared culture and the rest. But anyway, back to physicalism.

One of the main criticisms of physicalism is that it leaves unspecified which physics is taken to be all there is. This depends upon the assumption, often repeated by philosophers, that what there is can best be derived from a formalisation of some theory in a domain, and as physics covers all domains, it must have all the objects. I do not think this. For a start, an ideal and final physics is very unlikely to be developed any time soon; each time we have declared that we now have the standard model of this or that we find things that undercut or extend our conceptions (dark matter, dark energy, etc.). But deeper than this, I think that no matter what we finally conceptualise the world to be, it is likely not to be the only formal theory that can do this.

Again, we verb our nounings.  If we have a descriptive model of the universe in some representation, it may be that we have cut nature at the joints that interest us, but that some other beings might find unintuitive and maybe even incomprehensible. So I cannot think that I must assume that what exists in the world are all and only the objects that have classifications in some theory, no matter how accurate, precise and universal that theory might be.

Instead, though I think that whatever does exist will be describable in a physics if we can only investigate it. For instance, were it the case that qualia existed, then I would expect them to have some physical, causal effect on other objects, in ways that were regular and manipulable. If there is no causal effect, then I cannot think that class of things is real. Any kind of coincidental parallelism between qualia and brain states, for example, strikes me as a scientific, not to mention a metaphysical, miracle, and miracles are the enemy of understanding. So I don’t exclude qualia because they are not physical, but because if they are physical, they are mysterious and miraculous and uncausal.

So, what ontology should we expect to get from a physicalism, and where might the gaps be? I might leave that until another post…

Humans evolved in tribes, our species’ equivalent of the general primate troop structure. This meant that members of the tribe benefited from shared resources, the protection of the group and the inherited knowledge of the tribe. It also meant that we will natively and naively defend our group against others, and demonise the other groups. You see it in sports, culture, nations and religions. You see it in class, gender wars (there’s a reason men tend to denigrate and discriminate against women and intersex) and age cohorts. And recently, Australia has been showing it in spades: beginning with the racist dog whistles of government policy towards refugees over the past decade (yes, Labor, I’m including your execrable craven cowardice too!). And right now that tribalism is being used to take away legal rights that Australians have enjoyed for over 60 years. We are giving up rights like the presumption of innocence, public accountability of government, and general human rights.

I also see tribalism in the attacks by the antireligious on all religious believers (in fact much of the tribalism of the skeptical community stems from attacks upon Islamic belief, just as the current rash of state sponsored racism does). The irony here is that the reason the West hates Islam is because it used to be a competition between Christendom and the Caliphates for control over territory; and now it is the competition for control of oil resources. That irony is lost on the supposedly progressive skeptics movement, almost all of the time.

The fact is, it is not progressive humanistic thinking to replace one set of tribalisms with another set; that’s just hypocrisy and self-serving behaviour. We can get that at the local store – why do we need to be skeptics to do that? Why do we need to promote sexism or anti-non-Western attitudes in what should be a rational movement?

I want to say that rationality leads away from these tribalisms, but in fact rationality is, as old David H said, a slave to the passions, and sometimes (most of the time?) those passions are self-interested in the extreme. Sure, there were the cosmopolitan rational thinkers like Russell, or Tom Huxley, but they would not even get a decent twitter following these days. You gots to hate if you wants the fans.

I’m sick of it. No more labels for me: there are people and their actions. If they act well, I don’t give a flying fornication what their label is. And if they don’t, I don’t care they are supposed to be my peeps. I’m an anti-semic from now on.

Err… wait a minute…