I’ve stayed away from the current round of accusations and counteraccusations about accomodationism between religion and science. This is because I am a wishy washy Chamberlainist fencesitting Laodicean. But I am impressed by a few bloggers’ posts on the matter. First, what’s the background?
For many years there has been a divide between those who are not religious but think that promoting science should not exclude the religious, and those who are not religious and think that no defence of science should ever admit a religious believer at all. That is not quite the way they would put it of course, but the divide is between “accommodationists” and “exclusivists”.
Accommodationists hold, for various reasons, that when defending science, such as evolution (but not always), defenders should not assert that science is in opposition to religion. Instead, they should merely defend science.
Exclusivists, on the other hand, hold that science and religion are incompatible, and that to defend science one must, perforce, assert this incompatibility.
Each has a story about the motives of the other. Accommodationists think that exclusivists are being, variously, aggressive, militant, fundamentalist or just strategically stupid. Exclusivists think that accommodationists are being, diversely, incoherent, cowardly, stupid, or dishonest.
Much fun all round. So before I list the posts that I think approach the matter sensibly, a few points from moi:
- It is not the task of those who are not religious to find ways for the religious to harmonise their religion with science. That is the task of any religious adherent who wishes to live in the real world. But one may discuss whether it is possible, and if it is, conceptually, point out how, without thereby taking an advocacy role for religion. This is something that exclusivists think is just wrong. If I, as a non-religious person, think there is no evidence for some religious belief, I must therefore, on pain of self-contradiction (or self-immolation, or something) insist that nobody else can make the claim that their religious belief is consistent with science. Accusations of being a “religion lover” are uncomfortable echoes of previous intolerance.
- This is not just about strategy, but it is in part about strategy. The fact is that most people in society – whose taxes fund science, and whose governments decide on what science to fund – are religious or favourably disposed towards religion. A religious milieu is part of the ecology of science, so to speak. Making science the enemy of religion is going to have a single outcome, one that we can all predict. It won’t be the death of religion.
- As a point of fact, many people who are scientists are, actually and honestly, religious. Many religious are in favour of science. Why, then, should I insist that they give up one or the other? If I am trying to convert them to my way of thinking, that might be the way to go, but converting people to or from religious positions is not science; at best it’s philosophy, and at worst it is religious proselytising. Sure, atheism is not-pro-religion, but that doesn’t mean it is automatically not a religious position, and science, so far as I can tell, can only talk about empirical matters and their implications. So if to be religious means one admits of miracles, and science cannot either disprove miracles or accept them, one exceeds the bounds of science to insist that no miracles ever happen.
- All that notwithstanding, I fully concur with those who think that a science-defending institution or professional association, should make no assertions that science is compatible with religion either. That is, as I said in point 1, for the religious to sort out. Coincidentally, many religious bodies have done exactly that.
- Science and religion are not both seeking knowledge of the same things. The religious often make that assertion, that they are different epistemes or ways of knowing. If religion knows anything qua religion, it is nothing that can be investigated empirically, and when religion and science coincide on a view, it is an accident on religion’s part (or just common sense). In every case when a religious authority has asserted something about the physical world that is testable and novel, it is wrong. I know of no contrary examples. So what religion knows, if anything, is its own domain and topics, not those of science.
- Science and religion have never had “non-overlapping magisteria”. I know why Gould invented this, as a pluralist trying to effect a rapprochement, but it is just false. But likewise, there has never been a “warfare of religion against science”. The fact is, religion and science are like dancers on a crowded floor; sometimes they jostle each other for space, sometimes they are aware of the other and try to avoid conflict, and sometimes there’s just a bar brawl. Scientists often make religious pronouncements that are well outside the domain of their competence qua scientists, and theologians and clergy much more often make claims about science that are so silly they are funny, or would be if religion didn’t have the kind of political power that it usually has.
So, what’s set off the current round of claim, accusation and abuse? Jerry Coyne, a noted evolutionary biologist, wrote a piece in the New Republic and Chris Mooney, a science journalist who I like even if I don’t fully agree with everything he says, responded. Coyne is an exclusivist. Mooney a strategic accommodationist. The toing and froing can be found at their respective blogs (Coyne is a rare bird – a leading scientist who blogs). Mooney has been criticised by PZ Mashedpotato, Larry Moran at Sandwalk*, and various others.
What strikes me as regrettable is that this got personal very quickly. I’m not pointing fingers, but it does seem to me that exclusivists attack at the drop of a hat, calling people unscientific, ignorant, stupid and the like very quickly, for no more reason than that the person concerned disagrees with them! Okay, that’s perhaps what passes as debate these days – I blame debating rules as taught in schools – but such punditry does nobody any credit.
It is my opinion, for what it’s worth, that those who are accommodationists are not being cynical. I say this as an obvious accommodationist; it’s something I have argued for for years. We hold that it is better to not try to make science do what philosophy cannot, and eliminate all possible arationality from public debate by force majeure. And we hold that many good people, who think as well as the best of us and better than most, honestly think there is no conflict between science and religion. Sure, it is also the case that we should not alienate voters/funders/possible allies, but that’s not the main point.
Only those who are completely without self-knowledge think they are entirely rational on every subject, and that this licenses attacking others for their perceived failings in that respect. I know I won’t change their mind either.
Finally, let me say that the answer to the problem is not to shut anyone up. Exclusivists should put their case forcefully. Accommodationists should likewise. As I once said about public atheists, they should say as much as they can. I’m a Millian liberal, and free exchange of ideas is the best solution for society, not the suppression of any view. So when accommodationists or exclusivists insist the “other side” should be quiet, I demur. The more voices, the better.
Some good posts:
Coyne lists the posts to that time here.
Mooney lays out his creed here.
Josh Rosenau gets all sensible here and here.
Quodlibeta likewise.
Lawrence Krauss lays out the exclusivist argument well here.
* Yes, he who thinks I am an asportist, when in reality I am an anexercisist. I wish people would get the distinction straight…
Krauss laid out the exclusivist argument? He said:
And, truthfully,
Now the first is clearly fine with any accomodationist – especially the much reiterated point that a person can be a believer and a man or woman of science.
The second is just honest. But a person can believe those things and be scientists, as Krauss says, right?
That sounds hardcore accomodationist, and Krauss presents the argument in a way that makes a boatload more sense than Mooney’s argument.
Crap, that was supposed to be close-blockquote, not start a inset quote.
Did I fix that properly?
Yes, fixed properly. Thanks, and apologies for being too hasty to check it before clicking “Comment.”
Incidentally, I was at the panel where Krauss confronted his fellow panelists about the virgin birth, and Miller had an interesting answer. Miller said he could just say it’s a mystery, in which case he’d be open to attack for not being scientific. Alternately, he could discuss the prospects for parthenogenesis in mammals, in which case, Krauss could turn and say “see, you don’t think it’s a miracle.”
So, no, it wasn’t an explicit defense of Catholicism, but it’s not like Miller and Consalmagno (sp?) were flustered or stumped by the question. Miller simply recognized that there’s no way for a believer to answer an atheist in a way that will satisfy them. Which, ultimately, was just restating the problem.
Nicely done. You’ve encapsulated the argument and my own concerns about this particular debate very nicely. Better than I could have.
Why couldn’t Ken Miller just answer the question honestly? I wasn’t that difficult, was it?
I agree with Larry–Miller never answers the question. My theory is that he doesn’t want to actually tell people what he believes, for fear that signing onto superstitions would damage his credibility.
whyevolutionistrue // June 27, 2009 at 4:30 pm
Alternatively, Miller may be more concerned about his reputation among believers (which he is justly proud of), and fear that rejecting superstitions would damage his reputation among believers.
John,
as you already know I liked your post a lot, and I will probably do a post debating you on point 4, which I don’t think you have right (but pretty much everything else is)
More here
http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/intersection/2009/06/27/john-wilkins-is-making-sense/
re: answering the question
Perhaps scientist who are challenged on their “beliefs” feel that some questions and their answers are irrelevant to their science (as do I, in general). I would judge a scientist – professionally – on her/his ability to assess evidence in relation to a hypothesis or theory – if they stray into “signing onto” realities in the natural world, then they’re straying from their profession. That being said, I would guess that few people are scientists 24/7, viewing choices among fruit at the grocery store or assessing the teenage daughter’s new boyfriend as an experiment.
My theory is that he doesn’t want to actually tell people what he believes, for fear that signing onto superstitions would damage his credibility.
This is a circular argument of the “why are you hitting yourself?” variety. If Coyne isn’t prepared to say that Miller’s spiritual beliefs (whatever they may be) automatically diminish his scientific acumen, then why would Miller fear for his credibility? Might it have something to do with a massive campaign against “accomodationism” that works in part through guilt by association?
Perhaps Miller isn’t totally forthcoming about the nature of his views, but neither is Coyne in this instance. Do supernatural beliefs necessarily corrupt a scientist’s commitment to proper methodology? If not, then what difference do Miller’s beliefs make in the first place?
I never understood the epistemology on this. What can be “known” via religion? I’ve seen the claim a lot that religion is “another way of knowing”, but I’ve never seen anything like a coherent explanation of just what that “way” is. As far as I can tell, insofar as religion involves BELIEF, it involves believing things without anything like proper justification. But it seems to me that religion isn’t really about belief (i.e. it is not a “way of knowing” at all). It’s a type of primate social behavior. It’s about feelings and social bonds and reinforcing community values, not about knowledge. The beliefs serve to reinforce this social aspect (i.e. they should not be called “knowledge” at all–their proper study is the field of sociology, anthropology, psychology, etc., not epistemology).
Science and religion are not both seeking knowledge of the same things.
I never understood the epistemology on this.
You’re right about religion as a social construct, but in general it deals with different topics than science – probably the big three would be: 1) God, 2) a soul, and 3) and an afterlife. None of those are admissible scientific questions, at least not yet (despite what Dawkins says). Of course, that doesn’t mean that some religion has any better grasp of them than anyone else.
In some cases though, there is overlap, and that’s where the real conflict between religion and science exists. Things like Noah’s ark, and young earth, etc. Those are manifestly false in a scientific context. I suspect religion and science would actually get along reasonably well, if wasn’t for creationism.
I’d be careful here. One can certainly can approach the question of miracles empirically and find that the evidence for claims of miracles has consistently been elusive, that is, the evidence is in the form of friend of a friend stories, apocryphal accounts, or trivially explicable as some kind of natural cause, and that given this lousy track record, belief in miracles is ill-founded. Exclusivists at least would consider such an empirical approach to be scientific.
Eek! John, you say:
=====
Accommodationists hold, for various reasons, that when defending science, such as evolution (but not always), defenders should not assert that science is in opposition to religion. Instead, they should merely defend science.
Exclusivists, on the other hand, hold that science and religion are incompatible, and that to defend science one must, perforce, assert this incompatibility.
=====
No, that’s not how it works. At first I thought, before I went “Eek”, that you’d written the correct situation:
Anti-accommodationists hold, for various reasons, that when defending science, such as evolution (but not always), defenders should not assert that science is compatible with religion. Instead, they should merely defend science.
Accommodationists, on the other hand, hold that even if science and religion are incompatible, it is politically expedient to deny this incompatibility when defending science. Moreover, for reasons of political expediency, no one should bring up the incompatibility even while doing things other than defending science.
If it were as you say, I’d be an accommodationist. But the situation that we anti-accommodationists object to is as just set out.
I think that you are probably an anti-accommodationist, as I define the terms.
Well, I left comment at your blog, but yes, this is a debate that turns a lot on how you define terms. I think the terms “science” and “religion” are ill-defined. I define terms the way I do to make the positions absolutely distinct, but of course nobody plays exactly that stroke in the game.
science:religion :: empiricism:faith ?
I’m not so sure that “absolutely distinct” is the best criterion to gauge the usefulness of definitions. I’d suggest defining the labels based on the positions asserted by the people described by the labels.
Ian H Spedding FCD
“[science] does not assume the existence of a creator per the Demon Barber of Ockham.”
It may be important to note Friar Ockham beliefs (re: his ‘razor’)
Ockham’s Razor, in the senses in which it can be found in Ockham himself, never allows us to deny putative entities; at best it allows us to refrain from positing them in the absence of known compelling reasons for doing so. In part, this is because human beings can never be sure they know what is and what is not “beyond necessity”; the necessities are not always clear to us. But even if we did know them, Ockham would still not allow that his Razor allows us to deny entities that are unnecessary. For Ockham, the only truly necessary entity is God; everything else, the whole of creation, is radically contingent through and through. In short, Ockham does not accept the Principle of Sufficient Reason.
Nevertheless, we do sometimes have sufficient methodological grounds for positively affirming the existence of certain things. Ockham acknowledges three sources for such grounds (three sources of positive knowledge). As he says in Sent. I, dist. 30, q. 1: “For nothing ought to be posited without a reason given, unless it is self-evident (literally, known through itself) or known by experience or proved by the authority of Sacred Scripture.”
Just sayin’
C’mon Rob. You say
“Ockham’s Razor, in the senses in which it can be found in Ockham himself, never allows us to deny putative entities; at best it allows us to refrain from positing them”
Ian only said “[science] does not assume the existence of a creator per the Demon Barber of Ockham.” I don’t see a word about denying a creator. Just that we aren’t allowed to assume one. Just like Ockham says, it allows us to refrain from positing them.
Just sayin
Apologies; the quote about Ockham is from here: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ockham/#4.1
Based on the rest of his article, Wilkins seems to understand and encapsulate the issue very well. I think perhaps (though I’m only speculating) that the unfortunate wording was merely a mistake.
Plus, I’m not sure why the quibble over “anti-accommodationist” rather than “exclusivist.” Seems the same thing, doesn’t it? Maybe “exclusivist” is just a bit too stark for some tastes?
Of course, it’s almost 2:30 AM, and my faculties may be failing…
The quibble isn’t over “anti-accomodationist” rather than “exclusivist.” It’s that Blackford is claiming that Wilkins is defining his “accomodationists” the way everyone else is describing “anti-accomodationist”, and he’s defining “exclusivists” as holding a position that no-one actually holds.
By Wilkins’s definition, Coyne, Myers, Blackford, Dawkins, et. al. are “accomodationists,” Mooney* isn’t, and no-one (except, Blackford suggests, maybe Sam Harris) is an exclusivist.
*Mooney takes issue with Wilkins’ point 4, he seems to think that NCSE et al should endorse ways of reconciling religion with science (e.g. NOMA), instead of remaining neutral on the subject. He also (channeling Forrest) says Coyne et. al. should shut up about religion and science, though he later said that he didn’t say that.
That last comment was directed at Russell Blackford, sorry.
Well Ockham’s razor doesn’t not assume the existence of a creator, I suspect the good friar believed in God; it simply says use the simplest explanation consistent with the facts (i.e. don’t invoke God or miracles, also don’t invoke superfluous ideas, simplest is best).
It was St Aquinas in his Summa who stated that those practicing natural philosophy (science as we now call it) shouldn’t invoke God, this is simply because the natural world follows rules and regulations and that these are knowable and sufficient is most cases.
On the annoying Idiots, possibly correct. But if so, deliberately creating/upholding a falsehood for short term laughs isn’t very sensible in the long term.
As I noted in the “two truths” post:
http://evolvingthoughts.net/2009/06/08/the-doctrine-of-double-truth/
To J.C. Samuelson – the point about “exclusionism” isn’t so much the word. It’s that it’s used to define a position that no one holds, as far as I know (well it’s just possible that Sam Harris holds a position something like this … I’m not sure). I’m one of those pesky people who are identified as belonging to the anti-accommodationist team, but my position, to the extent that I can define it concisely, is as in my comment above. I think it’s pretty clear that I am actually an accommodationist by John’s definition! But then again so is Jerry Coyne.
All very confusing.
I’d be careful here. One can certainly can approach the question of miracles empirically and find that the evidence for claims of miracles has consistently been elusive, that is, the evidence is in the form of friend of a friend stories, apocryphal accounts, or trivially explicable as some kind of natural cause, and that given this lousy track record, belief in miracles is ill-founded. Exclusivists at least would consider such an empirical approach to be scientific.
It could be a hypothesis, but never much more than that. There is no iron-clad way of proving it, and you could probably also find many cases supporting miracles that would be hard to debunk on evidence alone, without just saying “that can’t happen!” (not that such claims are true). And one could always argue logically (but not scientifically), that reality is layered, with one-way causation underneath what we observe scientifically. We would be somewhat like software programs trying to determine the nature of the underlying hardware we’re running on, and that would be impossible without God-like intervention from the outside, no matter what scientific experiments we run. In models like that, things could happen for no apparent reason, and everything (consistency, etc) is controlled by the hidden layer. An assertion like that could not be proven or disproven, although Ockham may not favor it.
Me: What strikes me as regrettable is that this got very illogical very quickly. I’m not pointing fingers, but it does seem to me that accommodationists cede rationality at the drop of a hat, dropping non-sequiters, logical fallacies, and quote mining and the like very quickly, for no more reason than that the person concerned disagrees with them!
You: I never said that! Do you have any examples of anyone supporting the accommodationist side saying that?
Me: Now did I say you did this? I was even careful to say I wasn’t pointing fingers. In fact I had others in mind when I wrote that. And I still won’t point fingers.