The local evangelical students society had me along last night to talk about “Is belief in the Christian God rational?” I was on the negative, although I did ask them which side they wanted me to argue for. It was done in traditional debating format, and I found it incredibly restrictive – speakers were allowed to get away with introducing stuff they hadn’t mentioned in their main point piece, and a number of things were left up in the air.
Kudos to the undergraduate organisers Tim and Stewart for having a philosophy lecturer and a graduate student in physics and moral philosophy (Sebastian Schnelle, my cospeaker) address them while they, as undergraduates, took the affirmative. And they were very well behaved too, no Ken Ham-style rhetorical tricks (although I did make mention of the Gish Gallop, which may have forestalled some moves). But one thing that my honorable opponents did do is a standard way of framing such debates:
Worldviews.
Both pro speakers made mention of the fact that “atheism/agnosticism is a worldview of naturalism”. Now this is a theme that is repeated so often one might start to believe it if not for the fact that it licenses the following argument:
Christianity is a worldview that rests on a set of presuppositions.
Atheism and agnosticism is a worldview that rests on a set of presuppositions.
One’s choice of presuppositions makes one’s worldview reasonable.
===
Ergo, Christianity is a reasonable belief (at least as rational as agnosticism/atheism)
Similar arguments are put that “belief” in science is on a par with belief in Jesus or the Bible, and so this is really about duelling worldviews. That is, about which religion is correct.
But there’s a couple of deep flaws here. Agnosticism is the absence of knowledge about a god-claim. Atheism is the absence of a god-claim. Absences, although they may make the heart grow fonder, have no other implications. They cannot, for they are not-things, not things, and for something to have a property or implication it has to be a thing.
In simpler terms, as the old saying has it, bald is not a hair colour. Not believing in some religion is not a religion. It may be that those who are either agnostic about Christianity, or atheist about it, have some other set of commitments that might qualify as a religion, but they do not need to, just in virtue of being a not-theist or a not-knower. So the choice is between believing in Christianity or not-believing in Christianity. It is not a case of commensurable religions, but a religion and no religion. This is the privative fallacy, from the old term for a lack of something.
The other error is more widespread. I was in effect accused of having a worldview that precluded the existence of God, and the audience was invited to compare that with my opponents, who had one that permitted God. But the simple fact is, I don’t have a worldview. In fact, neither do they. I don’t think worldviews exist. They are a gross oversimplification of what is actually going on inside people’s heads, and are mere abstractions. If one believes in God, one might still believe things that are inconsistent with a belief in God. Intellectual schemes are not whole cloth, and you can entertain incompatible ideas, and in fact I think you must, because nobody gets a simple set of coherent ideas handed to them at birth, free of all confounding beliefs.
Christians, who have an extensive body of traditional dogma which they like to reassure themselves is true and consistent, like to think also that everybody has something like this. Religions are “rationally reconstructed” as sets of dogma by the Christian tradition (e.g., when doing anthropology by missionary) when in fact there is no dogma at all, just stories, rituals, and ways of life. The idea that one has a worldview by necessity is one that is made by analogy with a false view of themselves. The worldview tradition comes out of the propositional view of beliefs that ultimately found its best expression in Wittgenstein:
When two Principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled, then each man calls the other a fool and a heretic. On Certainty, §611
If a Lion could talk, we could not understand him. Philosophical Investigations, p190
The lion comment is understood as being based on meaning as a “form of life” (Lebensform): lions have a form of life that is different to us and so the meaning of their utterances would be opaque. Likewise, the principles (Prinzipe) are basic, fundamental, giving meaning to the belief system of their holders in ways that are ultimately equivalent and between which one cannot decide – you either hold the Prinzipe or not.
I think this is a fundamental error, on Wittgenstein’s part as much as that of anyone else who holds to this Weltanschauung mythology. If a lion could talk we’d understand quite a lot – because we share a form of life (we have an evolutionarily related biology, for a start), and two principles of human intellect also share forms of life – that of being human biologically and that of a shared history if there is one. And that shared nature means we can evaluate one or both for coherence, sense and reliability. Some views are just not amenable to a good life. I think Christianity is one, and not because I have some well-worked alternative I’d like to sell you, but because I can learn from the past and make inferences, and so can you.
Beliefs are not abstract sets of propositions. Or rather, some are, but not all of them. We have malformed, half formed and underinterpreted ideas all the time, but that doesn’t give us a conceptual scheme. In this regard I am with Donald Davidson’s attack on the very idea.
So to my Christian audience I say, do not commit either the privative fallacy or the Weltanschauung mistake. If you think you can evade my and others criticisms by assigning some faux ideology to us in virtue of us not adopting your own preferred set of absolutes, you are greatly mistaken, and building a nice strawman to knock over.
Just to be a bit clearer, I have met people who call themselves Atheists, who claim outright that no God exists, and thus they don’t believe in Him. Rather than a lack of a god-claim (“I don’t believe in God”, they have made an absolute negative god-claim (“God does not exist”). Thus the two different types of Atheism. The latter is usually based on or bolstered by the materialist philosophical position, and is the one most Christians mean when arguing from worldview.
Besides “God does not exist”, that brand of Atheism makes several more derivative claims.
That the universe came into being in some manner other than an all-powerful being; the Big Bang is the most popular choice.
That the human species (and all life on Earth) came into being in some other manner; evolution is the most popular method, while the actual start of life has no popularly accepted theory.
That the universe will become completely uninhabitable in the far-distant future; the Big Fizzle (total entropy) and the Big Crunch were the two biggest contenders last time I checked.
That life ends at death, no undo, no takebacks; under the materialist flavor, the only possibilities of eternal life are technological, and they are unlikely to survive Crunch or Fizzle.
That nobody’s views on Right and Wrong are objectively Right or Wrong, and there is no Meaning of Life; Nietzche made his position clear, and if I was certain that death would be the end of me, I’d advocate people read a lot more Nietzche, Rand, and Spider Robinson. (I am a fan of all three, by the way, and a Christian.)
The worldview concept is not flawed in principle. Most people simply don’t think through the implications and interactions of their belief systems. Each worldview is based on propositions, however, and it is valid to test each proposition against objective facts… if it can be.
Untestable propositions are a longstanding tradition in most worldviews. I have seen many people use derived implications as propositions, to their detriment.
The proposition I’ve come to find most amusing in Atheism is the axiom that God is irrational. It’s usually stated one of two ways: “A person who believes in God is irrational” or “The concept of God is irrational.” The first is a categorical error; there are many rational people who believe in God. The second is also erroneous; many people have discussed the idea of God in perfectly sound rational arguments.
Just to be a bit clearer, I have met people who call themselves Atheists, who claim outright that no God exists, and thus they don’t believe in Him. Rather than a lack of a god-claim (“I don’t believe in God”, they have made an absolute negative god-claim (“God does not exist”). Thus the two different types of Atheism. The latter is usually based on or bolstered by the materialist philosophical position, and is the one most Christians mean when arguing from worldview.
Besides “God does not exist”, that brand of Atheism makes several more derivative claims.
That the universe came into being in some manner other than an all-powerful being; the Big Bang is the most popular choice.
That the human species (and all life on Earth) came into being in some other manner; evolution is the most popular method, while the actual start of life has no popularly accepted theory.
That the universe will become completely uninhabitable in the far-distant future; the Big Fizzle (total entropy) and the Big Crunch were the two biggest contenders last time I checked.
That life ends at death, no undo, no takebacks; under the materialist flavor, the only possibilities of eternal life are technological, and they are unlikely to survive Crunch or Fizzle.
That nobody’s views on Right and Wrong are objectively Right or Wrong, and there is no Meaning of Life; Nietzche made his position clear, and if I was certain that death would be the end of me, I’d advocate people read a lot more Nietzche, Rand, and Spider Robinson. (I am a fan of all three, by the way, and a Christian.)
The worldview concept is not flawed in principle. Most people simply don’t think through the implications and interactions of their belief systems. Each worldview is based on propositions, however, and it is valid to test each proposition against objective facts… if it can be.
Untestable propositions are a longstanding tradition in most worldviews. I have seen many people use derived implications as propositions, to their detriment.
The proposition I’ve come to find most amusing in Atheism is the axiom that God is irrational. It’s usually stated one of two ways: “A person who believes in God is irrational” or “The concept of God is irrational.” The first is a categorical error; there are many rational people who believe in God. The second is also erroneous; many people have discussed the idea of God in perfectly sound rational arguments.
Spaulding @ # 20: antitheism: “I believe that there are no gods.”
On first blush, I would tend to interpret that word as meaning something like, “I believe there is a god, and I oppose him.”
This makes antitheism a form of theism, a paradox which should make all good philosophers’ toes wiggle with delight.(Not to mention setting the stage for the next saga from Michael Moorcock or James Morrow.)
At the risk of violent backlash from etymologists (for compounding Latin & Greek roots), may I suggest the belief in no-gods might be better dubbed negatheism?
Spaulding @ # 20: antitheism: “I believe that there are no gods.”
On first blush, I would tend to interpret that word as meaning something like, “I believe there is a god, and I oppose him.”
This makes antitheism a form of theism, a paradox which should make all good philosophers’ toes wiggle with delight.(Not to mention setting the stage for the next saga from Michael Moorcock or James Morrow.)
At the risk of violent backlash from etymologists (for compounding Latin & Greek roots), may I suggest the belief in no-gods might be better dubbed negatheism?
@28: yes, I’ve heard all the arguments before. I’m was a philosophy major, so I’ve actually studied all the arguments.
No, my response wasn’t meant to be a “strawman.”
It was merely to point out that the author was (in my mind) misusing a fairly critical word.
As for answering the question of whether belief in God is rational, I actually agree that it isn’t. I know I can’t prove to anyone that God exists. I can’t prove that he doesn’t. So for me, belief is a choice, partly rational, but mostly emotional. Do I refuse to believe something just because I can’t see/touch/smell/prove it, or do I accept it and explore it. I chose the latter, but I can understand why people choose the former.
@27: Yes, usage has changed recently, which is what dictionaries show. That doesn’t make the new usage right, just a lot of people wrong. I believe you’ll also find “ain’t” in the dictionary, though you’d be hard-pressed to find an English Professor who’d accept it in an essay.
Interesting stuff, John, I enjoyed reading that.
One thing that #23 didn’t mention about those belief terms is that some of the labels can be combined: one can lack a belief that there is a god, whilst believing that we can never know this fact, and is therefore correctly described as an ‘atheist agnostic’. If they instead believe we can know this fact they are an ‘atheist gnostic’. The same modifications can be made to the label of ‘theist’ as ‘theist agnostic’ and ‘theist gnostic’. We can obviously use the same trick with ‘antitheism’ and ‘ignosticism’, though some of the resultant labels will not be coherent, and so have no application (e.g. a ‘theist ignostic’ doesn’t exist, and so ‘atheist’ will be redundant in ‘atheist ignostic’).
I prefer these labels to those tack on ‘strong’ or ‘weak’, since it makes it clear what one is committed to – someone who calls themselves a ‘strong atheist’ only seems to be expressing that they have a strong disbelief in God, and are therefore not required to defend it, but someone who calls themselves a ‘atheist gnostic’ is making an implicit knowledge-claim, and like all knowledge-claims, one is claiming to be able to support the assertion with evidence sufficient to uphold it*. An ‘atheist agnostic’, on the other hand, really isn’t claiming anything at all, apart from the fact that he has a lack of belief in God, which provides for the distinction #31 makes.
I think this works nicely: we preserve the usual meaning of the prefix ‘a-’ as a negation, and we explain why an agnostic and an atheist often sound similar (both parties are often ‘atheist agnostic’) as #4 said.
*(Much confusion comes from a couple of norms of discourse and how they interact: first, there is the norm that one should not supply more information than is necessary to get one’s point across, and so if wishes to express his opinion that ‘God does not exist’, then you don’t qualify it as a belief, as this extra info implies that your belief is especially weak; second, there is the norm that one should not assert what one does not know, since a straightforward assertion misleads the hearer to think that the testimony is solid, when it is not.
So you can see where the problems arise, with atheists and theists thinking each other to be making the stronger claims, and why discussions between them typically lessen in intensity (and stagnate) once they begin qualifying their assertions as personal statements.)
Interesting stuff, John, I enjoyed reading that.
One thing that #23 didn’t mention about those belief terms is that some of the labels can be combined: one can lack a belief that there is a god, whilst believing that we can never know this fact, and is therefore correctly described as an ‘atheist agnostic’. If they instead believe we can know this fact they are an ‘atheist gnostic’. The same modifications can be made to the label of ‘theist’ as ‘theist agnostic’ and ‘theist gnostic’. We can obviously use the same trick with ‘antitheism’ and ‘ignosticism’, though some of the resultant labels will not be coherent, and so have no application (e.g. a ‘theist ignostic’ doesn’t exist, and so ‘atheist’ will be redundant in ‘atheist ignostic’).
I prefer these labels to those tack on ‘strong’ or ‘weak’, since it makes it clear what one is committed to – someone who calls themselves a ‘strong atheist’ only seems to be expressing that they have a strong disbelief in God, and are therefore not required to defend it, but someone who calls themselves a ‘atheist gnostic’ is making an implicit knowledge-claim, and like all knowledge-claims, one is claiming to be able to support the assertion with evidence sufficient to uphold it*. An ‘atheist agnostic’, on the other hand, really isn’t claiming anything at all, apart from the fact that he has a lack of belief in God, which provides for the distinction #31 makes.
I think this works nicely: we preserve the usual meaning of the prefix ‘a-’ as a negation, and we explain why an agnostic and an atheist often sound similar (both parties are often ‘atheist agnostic’) as #4 said.
*(Much confusion comes from a couple of norms of discourse and how they interact: first, there is the norm that one should not supply more information than is necessary to get one’s point across, and so if wishes to express his opinion that ‘God does not exist’, then you don’t qualify it as a belief, as this extra info implies that your belief is especially weak; second, there is the norm that one should not assert what one does not know, since a straightforward assertion misleads the hearer to think that the testimony is solid, when it is not.
So you can see where the problems arise, with atheists and theists thinking each other to be making the stronger claims, and why discussions between them typically lessen in intensity (and stagnate) once they begin qualifying their assertions as personal statements.)
Interesting stuff, John, I enjoyed reading that.
One thing that #23 didn’t mention about those belief terms is that some of the labels can be combined: one can lack a belief that there is a god, whilst believing that we can never know this fact, and is therefore correctly described as an ‘atheist agnostic’. If they instead believe we can know this fact they are an ‘atheist gnostic’. The same modifications can be made to the label of ‘theist’ as ‘theist agnostic’ and ‘theist gnostic’. We can obviously use the same trick with ‘antitheism’ and ‘ignosticism’, though some of the resultant labels will not be coherent, and so have no application (e.g. a ‘theist ignostic’ doesn’t exist, and so ‘atheist’ will be redundant in ‘atheist ignostic’).
I prefer these labels to those tack on ‘strong’ or ‘weak’, since it makes it clear what one is committed to – someone who calls themselves a ‘strong atheist’ only seems to be expressing that they have a strong disbelief in God, and are therefore not required to defend it, but someone who calls themselves a ‘atheist gnostic’ is making an implicit knowledge-claim, and like all knowledge-claims, one is claiming to be able to support the assertion with evidence sufficient to uphold it*. An ‘atheist agnostic’, on the other hand, really isn’t claiming anything at all, apart from the fact that he has a lack of belief in God, which provides for the distinction #31 makes.
I think this works nicely: we preserve the usual meaning of the prefix ‘a-’ as a negation, and we explain why an agnostic and an atheist often sound similar (both parties are often ‘atheist agnostic’) as #4 said.
*(Much confusion comes from a couple of norms of discourse and how they interact: first, there is the norm that one should not supply more information than is necessary to get one’s point across, and so if wishes to express his opinion that ‘God does not exist’, then you don’t qualify it as a belief, as this extra info implies that your belief is especially weak; second, there is the norm that one should not assert what one does not know, since a straightforward assertion misleads the hearer to think that the testimony is solid, when it is not.
So you can see where the problems arise, with atheists and theists thinking each other to be making the stronger claims, and why discussions between them typically lessen in intensity (and stagnate) once they begin qualifying their assertions as personal statements.)
Interesting stuff, John, I enjoyed reading that.
One thing that #23 didn’t mention about those belief terms is that some of the labels can be combined: one can lack a belief that there is a god, whilst believing that we can never know this fact, and is therefore correctly described as an ‘atheist agnostic’. If they instead believe we can know this fact they are an ‘atheist gnostic’. The same modifications can be made to the label of ‘theist’ as ‘theist agnostic’ and ‘theist gnostic’. We can obviously use the same trick with ‘antitheism’ and ‘ignosticism’, though some of the resultant labels will not be coherent, and so have no application (e.g. a ‘theist ignostic’ doesn’t exist, and so ‘atheist’ will be redundant in ‘atheist ignostic’).
I prefer these labels to those tack on ‘strong’ or ‘weak’, since it makes it clear what one is committed to – someone who calls themselves a ‘strong atheist’ only seems to be expressing that they have a strong disbelief in God, and are therefore not required to defend it, but someone who calls themselves a ‘atheist gnostic’ is making an implicit knowledge-claim, and like all knowledge-claims, one is claiming to be able to support the assertion with evidence sufficient to uphold it*. An ‘atheist agnostic’, on the other hand, really isn’t claiming anything at all, apart from the fact that he has a lack of belief in God, which provides for the distinction #31 makes.
I think this works nicely: we preserve the usual meaning of the prefix ‘a-’ as a negation, and we explain why an agnostic and an atheist often sound similar (both parties are often ‘atheist agnostic’) as #4 said.
*(Much confusion comes from a couple of norms of discourse and how they interact: first, there is the norm that one should not supply more information than is necessary to get one’s point across, and so if wishes to express his opinion that ‘God does not exist’, then you don’t qualify it as a belief, as this extra info implies that your belief is especially weak; second, there is the norm that one should not assert what one does not know, since a straightforward assertion misleads the hearer to think that the testimony is solid, when it is not.
So you can see where the problems arise, with atheists and theists thinking each other to be making the stronger claims, and why discussions between them typically lessen in intensity (and stagnate) once they begin qualifying their assertions as personal statements.)
Interesting stuff, John, I enjoyed reading that.
One thing that #23 didn’t mention about those belief terms is that some of the labels can be combined: one can lack a belief that there is a god, whilst believing that we can never know this fact, and is therefore correctly described as an ‘atheist agnostic’. If they instead believe we can know this fact they are an ‘atheist gnostic’. The same modifications can be made to the label of ‘theist’ as ‘theist agnostic’ and ‘theist gnostic’. We can obviously use the same trick with ‘antitheism’ and ‘ignosticism’, though some of the resultant labels will not be coherent, and so have no application (e.g. a ‘theist ignostic’ doesn’t exist, and so ‘atheist’ will be redundant in ‘atheist ignostic’).
I prefer these labels to those tack on ‘strong’ or ‘weak’, since it makes it clear what one is committed to – someone who calls themselves a ‘strong atheist’ only seems to be expressing that they have a strong disbelief in God, and are therefore not required to defend it, but someone who calls themselves a ‘atheist gnostic’ is making an implicit knowledge-claim, and like all knowledge-claims, one is claiming to be able to support the assertion with evidence sufficient to uphold it*. An ‘atheist agnostic’, on the other hand, really isn’t claiming anything at all, apart from the fact that he has a lack of belief in God, which provides for the distinction #31 makes.
I think this works nicely: we preserve the usual meaning of the prefix ‘a-’ as a negation, and we explain why an agnostic and an atheist often sound similar (both parties are often ‘atheist agnostic’) as #4 said.
*(Much confusion comes from a couple of norms of discourse and how they interact: first, there is the norm that one should not supply more information than is necessary to get one’s point across, and so if wishes to express his opinion that ‘God does not exist’, then you don’t qualify it as a belief, as this extra info implies that your belief is especially weak; second, there is the norm that one should not assert what one does not know, since a straightforward assertion misleads the hearer to think that the testimony is solid, when it is not.
So you can see where the problems arise, with atheists and theists thinking each other to be making the stronger claims, and why discussions between them typically lessen in intensity (and stagnate) once they begin qualifying their assertions as personal statements.)
“The proposition I’ve come to find most amusing in Atheism is the axiom that God is irrational. It’s usually stated one of two ways: “A person who believes in God is irrational” or “The concept of God is irrational.” The first is a categorical error; there are many rational people who believe in God. The second is also erroneous; many people have discussed the idea of God in perfectly sound rational arguments.”
BlueNight, I think the first of those explications should be read as “A person who believes in God is irrational insofar as they believe in God”, not that the entire breadth of their thought is irrational for the mere fact that one of their beliefs is. How about some interpretive charity, eh?
With the second, it depends on how God is defined, which it so often is not. Some conceptions of God are certainly incoherent, and thus one cannot believe them rationally. Indeed, I think that the usual attributes assigned to God (omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, and omnibenevolence) come very close to making ‘God’ incoherent. So whilst the concept of God may yet be retained in a sophisticated form by people as yourself, the opinion that ‘the concept of God is irrational’ may yet be true in most cases. In fact, if the concept remains undefined in the general consciousness, then “God’ seems to be, as regards these minds, incoherent by default – and so irrational to believe.
“The proposition I’ve come to find most amusing in Atheism is the axiom that God is irrational. It’s usually stated one of two ways: “A person who believes in God is irrational” or “The concept of God is irrational.” The first is a categorical error; there are many rational people who believe in God. The second is also erroneous; many people have discussed the idea of God in perfectly sound rational arguments.”
BlueNight, I think the first of those explications should be read as “A person who believes in God is irrational insofar as they believe in God”, not that the entire breadth of their thought is irrational for the mere fact that one of their beliefs is. How about some interpretive charity, eh?
With the second, it depends on how God is defined, which it so often is not. Some conceptions of God are certainly incoherent, and thus one cannot believe them rationally. Indeed, I think that the usual attributes assigned to God (omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, and omnibenevolence) come very close to making ‘God’ incoherent. So whilst the concept of God may yet be retained in a sophisticated form by people as yourself, the opinion that ‘the concept of God is irrational’ may yet be true in most cases. In fact, if the concept remains undefined in the general consciousness, then “God’ seems to be, as regards these minds, incoherent by default – and so irrational to believe.
“The proposition I’ve come to find most amusing in Atheism is the axiom that God is irrational. It’s usually stated one of two ways: “A person who believes in God is irrational” or “The concept of God is irrational.” The first is a categorical error; there are many rational people who believe in God. The second is also erroneous; many people have discussed the idea of God in perfectly sound rational arguments.”
BlueNight, I think the first of those explications should be read as “A person who believes in God is irrational insofar as they believe in God”, not that the entire breadth of their thought is irrational for the mere fact that one of their beliefs is. How about some interpretive charity, eh?
With the second, it depends on how God is defined, which it so often is not. Some conceptions of God are certainly incoherent, and thus one cannot believe them rationally. Indeed, I think that the usual attributes assigned to God (omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, and omnibenevolence) come very close to making ‘God’ incoherent. So whilst the concept of God may yet be retained in a sophisticated form by people as yourself, the opinion that ‘the concept of God is irrational’ may yet be true in most cases. In fact, if the concept remains undefined in the general consciousness, then “God’ seems to be, as regards these minds, incoherent by default – and so irrational to believe.
“The proposition I’ve come to find most amusing in Atheism is the axiom that God is irrational. It’s usually stated one of two ways: “A person who believes in God is irrational” or “The concept of God is irrational.” The first is a categorical error; there are many rational people who believe in God. The second is also erroneous; many people have discussed the idea of God in perfectly sound rational arguments.”
BlueNight, I think the first of those explications should be read as “A person who believes in God is irrational insofar as they believe in God”, not that the entire breadth of their thought is irrational for the mere fact that one of their beliefs is. How about some interpretive charity, eh?
With the second, it depends on how God is defined, which it so often is not. Some conceptions of God are certainly incoherent, and thus one cannot believe them rationally. Indeed, I think that the usual attributes assigned to God (omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, and omnibenevolence) come very close to making ‘God’ incoherent. So whilst the concept of God may yet be retained in a sophisticated form by people as yourself, the opinion that ‘the concept of God is irrational’ may yet be true in most cases. In fact, if the concept remains undefined in the general consciousness, then “God’ seems to be, as regards these minds, incoherent by default – and so irrational to believe.
German is always trickier than one thinks, native speakers unsurprisingly included. A Lebensform is something you are, not something you have, a concrete manifestation of life, for example a species or “life as we know it”. In this case, the lion is “life alien enough that we don’t actually understand it”. And “principle/principles” is Prinzip/Prinzipien; il principe is “the prince” in Italian…
Most aren’t. I know, I was one.
David
As to Lebensformen, whatever they might be or mean in ordinary German, in Wittgenstein they are roughly like Sumner’s “folkways”, only they are in this case biological. And it was indeed a typo: Prinzipe, nicht Principe. I will correct the post.
David
As to Lebensformen, whatever they might be or mean in ordinary German, in Wittgenstein they are roughly like Sumner’s “folkways”, only they are in this case biological. And it was indeed a typo: Prinzipe, nicht Principe. I will correct the post.
David
As to Lebensformen, whatever they might be or mean in ordinary German, in Wittgenstein they are roughly like Sumner’s “folkways”, only they are in this case biological. And it was indeed a typo: Prinzipe, nicht Principe. I will correct the post.