I opened Structure of Scientific Theories asserting that the “most central or important” problem in philosophy of science is “the nature and structure of theories . . . . For theories are the vehicle of scientific knowledge and one way or another become involved in most aspects of the scientific enterprise” … . Don’t believe it for a moment! Today much of science is atheoretical, as it was then. For example, theory development is incidental to most of today’s chemistry. The business of most experimental and observational science is modeling data increasingly so as science has become computationally intensive. Today, models are the main vehicle of scientific knowledge. [Fred Suppe, "Understanding Scientific Theories: An Assessment of Developments, 1969-1998”. Philosophy of Science, Vol. 67, Supplement. Proceedings of the 1998 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers (Sep., 2000), pp. S102-S115, page S109]
Evolution quotes: Theories are not the whole of science
Filed under Philosophy, Quotes, Science, Theories
Evolution quotes: Socialism
To the biologist the problem of socialism appears largely as a problem of size. The extreme socialists desire to run every nation as a single business concern. I do not suppose that Henry Ford would find much difficulty in running Andorra or Luxembourg on a socialistic basis. He has already more men on his pay-roll than their population. It is conceivable that a syndicate of Fords, if we could find them, would make Belgium Ltd or Denmark Inc. pay their way. But while nationalization of certain industries is an obvious possibility in the largest of states, I find it no easier to picture a completely socialized British Empire or United States than an elephant turning somersaults or a hippopotamus jumping a hedge.
[J. B. S. Haldane, “On Being the Right Size” 1928]
Empirical Perspectives
Jim Goetz, frequent commenter here, has started up what looks to be a physics and science blog at Empirical Perspectives. Go visit and make rude comments.
Filed under Administrative, General Science, Science
Why eat meat?
A while back, the New York Times held a blog competition on justifications for eating meat, in 600 words or less. I submitted mine, but I bet it didn’t get far up the selection tree, as the winner is effectively a popular piece rather than a philosophical justification, and so I think I miscast my bait somewhat. Still, on the principle that nothing I write should ever go to waste, here it is…
Why we should eat meat
Humans, along with other primates, eat mostly roots, vegetables and nuts, but will eat meat when it is available. Meat is a valuable source of proteins and other nutritional resources, and it cannot be wasted. But while this is a statement of fact, it is not a statement of moral obligation or permission. I want to argue that our evolutionary history makes eating meat not only inevitable, but worthwhile, although I would not advocate eating as much meat as we now do in the west.
There are many theories of ethics, but one of the oldest and most influential is a view that goes back at least to Aristotle: the Good Life is one that leads to the flourishing of human life. This is called “eudaimonia” in Aristotle. Now on this account, one should do what it is that contributes to eudaimonia, and it happens that all agree humans evolved to, and do best when they do, eat a diet of mostly plant matter, with some amount of meat, the famous “food pyramid” from primary school. There are nutrients humans require that meat provides which are impossible or very difficult to get any other way.
Eudaimonism is a “species-relative” ethics. Unlike the universalist ethics of vegetarianism, moral rights and duties are not necessarily extended to other species, but they do apply to all humans. In The Expanding Circle, Peter Singer argued that moral rights and standing are universal to all sentient beings; a eudaimonian view does not presume this. This is the universalism of Kant, not Bentham. We know all humans have rights and moral standing; we need to know on what basis rights might be ascribed to animals. We presuppose that members of the human species have a moral nature.
Societies choose to ascribe rights based on these moral properties of people. It might be objected that this view would make cruelty towards animals permissible. That doesn’t follow. As Kant noted, animal cruelty affects human beings, degrading their moral nature, and on that ground alone it should be prohibited. But we might also ascribe rights to nonhumans based on their having some or all of the moral properties humans have. For example, adult great apes have around the cognitive capacities of a three to five year old human; and so they should have the rights and protection afforded these humans.
So we might not eat, or permit to be eaten, great apes and other species with comparable cognitive abilities. But our food animals are not in that class (and those that are in some cultures, like dogs, should be excluded from being food animals). We should require that meat animals are slaughtered (and raised) humanely (that is, without cruelty and pain), but that is not enough to prohibit our eating them.
One implication of this however is that we must do all the things that contribute to human flourishing, and this is going to include reducing the amount of meat eaten, for several reasons: too much meat leads to various diseases, from gout to heart disease; meat is an expensive resource and ultimately is unsustainable at current levels; and meat animals are often invasive and ecologically damaging.
In all things, proportionality is the key to flourishing. Too much of any good can become an evil. A little meat is a good; a lot is an evil. This also is an old view from the Greeks. Epicureans held that pleasure is a good, but too much is not. In contrast to the extremism of vegetarianism, all things, in moderation, for human flourishing is the way.
Filed under Ethics and Moral Philosophy, Evolution, Philosophy
Analytic thinking, religion and science – the rhetoric and the psychology
Over the past few decades there has been an increasingly large literature on styles of thinking and cognitive biases (to which I am grateful to Jocelyn Stoller, a reader of this blog, for introducing me) in psychology, culminating in the marvellous book, which I recommend to everyone, by Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow. If you want to understand about how we think, this is the best book for it.
Kahneman, in conjunction with his late colleague Amos Tversky, identified two cognitive systems in our minds, which they called, using prior terminology, System 1 and System 2. System 1 is the immediate response cognitive system – it doesn’t involve reflection or mediated judgement. It is how you know to avoid a thrown object or to recognise a face. System 2, however, is under some control and is something you are aware of as you employ it, and it takes effort.
Here’s how Kahneman defined the two (p20):
System 1 operates automatically and quickly with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control.
System 2 allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex computations. The operations of System 2 are often associated with the subjective experience of agency, choice and concentration.
Unfortunately, the questions are often expressed in “folk psychology” terms such as “intuitive” and “analytic”, which is both loaded and poorly expressed. System 1 is not intuitive; it is automatic. System 2 is not (always) analytic; it is, however, always an effort.
Why have I mentioned this? It is because of an unfortunately framed paper in Science: “Analytic Thinking Promotes Religious Disbelief” by Will M. Gervais and Ara Norenzayan [Science 27 April 2012: 336 (6080), 493-496. DOI:10.1126/science.1215647]. This paper claims, with evidence to back it up, that System 1 tends to support religious belief while System 2 tends to erode it. The Scientific American blog immediately framed this as “critical thinkers tend to lose faith”, which is implied in the paper, but is not exactly what is shown.
Of course this got picked up and played according to American social lines here by intellectual media, and was attacked by Trent Dougherty at Problogion here. This is a storm in a frame, rather than a substantive issue. Suppose somebody (say, Robert McCauley’s latest book, Why religion is natural and science is not) argued that we have a native disposition to take religious views because of our evolved cognitive machinery, while disbelief takes an effort? This doesn’t play into American dispute windows. Consequently, it gets a lot less attention, though it is by far a more interesting claim to make and investigate.
Norenzayan is no amateur in this field, but one might wish to ignore or eliminate these framing issues and look at what is important: cognitive styles are different in cost, in outcome and in usefulness, and with respect to religious belief, it is cheaper and quicker to adopt it than to reject it. This is especially the case if (as I think) one of the heuristics evolution has given us is to follow our surrounding culture because those who adopt it aren’t dead yet, so my adopting it won’t make me dead either.
As McCauley says, science is hard. I can become a fully functioning participant in a religion by age 7 or 8, but to become educated in science and critical thinking make take another decade or more. If critical reasoning leads to the abandonment of religious belief, it may be this is simply because it comes off a very high base of belief, and so any movement is likely to move the population away from that peak.
It does not follow either that religious belief is contrary to analytic thinking, or that disbelief is more critical than belief, although I happen to think in the modern social context that might very well be true as a generalisation. I know, personally, many critical religious believers and many uncritical disbelievers; the dynamic here is more about personal histories and styles than general movements.
I understand that scientists wish to get attention – all academics do that for their work. But expressing one claim (that religion is more a System 1 feature than a System 2 feature) in loaded terms (that religion is more “intuitive” than “analytic”) is, I think, a mistake best left to the journalists to commit.
Filed under Cognition, Epistemology, Evolution, Philosophy, Religion, Science, Social evolution
Evolution quotes: Arguments
Arguments have no chance against petrified training; they wear it as little as the waves wear a cliff.
Mark Twain, A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court
Carnival of Evolution 47: All the Evolution News that’s Fit to Blog

Welcome to the 47th edition of the Carnival of Evolution. We have had our science reporters out in force hunting down the best of the blogosphere on evolution and related subjects, and here they are for your delectation and delight and other d-words.
First some links I encountered in my random walk through the webbies: Face to face with primate facial diversity at Wild Mammal Blog gives information about the evolution of facial colouring in South American primates. Social evolution in mole rats at the same blog discusses the adaptive niches of naked mole rats (not all of which are social or eusocial, by the way). And the agony column Molecular Love asks The evolution perspective: Do antidepressants do more harm than good?; and the answer is not clear.
Reporter Bradley Alicea at Synthetic Daisies tells the story of Recent Advances Towards a Truly Darwinian Neurodynamics, which is a good review of an emerging area at the interface of artificial and natural evolutionary systems (based on a recently-published paper). He also gives an excellent overview of The Neuromechanics and Evolution of Very Slow Movements, in sloths and turtles, but also fast movements in woodpeckers.
Humorist David Morrison at The Genealogical World of Phylogenetic Networks (there’s a mouthful) notes that Steven Jay Gould was wrong: You can find Copes’ Rule in manufactured objects. Cars, for instance, tend to get bigger… Almost as humorous if it were not so serious, reporter Troy Britain offers a human interest story about a silly creationist who can’t get anything right about horse evolution at Playing Chess with Pigeons, in a story entitled Open mouth, insert hoof.
The science reporter at Bytesize Biology discusses recent research in It’s a smORF world, after all? Small open reading frames are everywhere (in Drosophila, anyway)
The living rainbow: In budgies, same-sex courting isn’t practice for wooing the ladies: Essayist Jeremy Yoder at Denim and Tweed observes that the gay rainbow is found in budgies and it isn’t just practice for hetero mating. In Notes from the field: What’s Chris doing to that Joshua tree? he also discusses why Joshua trees have two distinct phenotypes. It’s all about what fertilises them. Sex, sex, sex; it’s all the young folk think about these days! I’m tempted to write a letter to the Times.
At Nothing in Biology Makes Sense, our intrepid observer devindrown argues that hosts can survive parasitism in Multidimensional coevolution, no oscillation overthruster required. At the same blog, embedded journalist Hird shows how critically endangered species used illegally in Traditional Chinese Medicine can be identified by Genetic Auditing.
In breaking news, David Winter talks about Flightless Flies (not Walks – dad joke) at Sciblogs. Many of them are bloodsuckers.
Our man in the lab, Kevin Zelnio, discusses my favourite topic, Species Concepts at the Scientific American blog. Michael Ryan, senior correspondent at Paleoblog, mentions the father of cladistics, Willi Hennig’s, birthday.
Womens’ Affairs Reporter (it had to be a man, didn’t it?), Zen Faulkes, sensei at Neurodojo, covers the question of why women wear red. Answer: It’s sexy but not sexual, and he returns to the issue to consider how cultural bias might influence such evolutionary psychological explanations.
Occasional science reporter (he usually covers the religion beat) PZ Myers at little known blog, Pharyngula, shows how modular gene networks can place eyes in all kinds of places, and just generally be the source of evolutionary novelties.
In the features page, politics reporter Joachim D asks who coined the term “social Darwinism” at Mousetrap. [He missed William Graham Sumner, though.]
Hidden in the classifieds, Bug Girl gets onto one of my pet peeves with Taxonomy Fails, in this case cochineal insects not being beetles. She works up a useful metric for taxonomy fails.
The education pages cover the question of whether there is a biology of metaphysics (as opposed to a metaphysics of biology?) via reporter Ken Weiss at The Mermaid’s Tale in Metaphysics in science, Part II: Life in a cave. Are philosophical objects blind in caves? Thanks to Anne Buchanan for the notice.
The cookery pages editor, Katie Sorene at The Flying Fugu, asks Was the Caveman Diet Healthier than Our Own? What did ancient humans eat during the paleolithic era? Was their diet healthier than our own? What we can we learn from evolutionary nutritional standards and could we benefit from adopting the Paleo diet today?
Suzanne Elvidge at Genomic Engineering reports on news on Stickleback genetics and evolution, and on how Athletic frogs have faster-changing genomes, and how Synthetic genetic material, XNA, can replicate and evolve and DNA data: Polar bears evolved 600,000 years ago. This is a good blog to subscribe to for the news front page.
Danielle Whittaker Tyler Hether at the evolution consortium BEACON reports on work done there on The effect of landscapes and ecology on gene flow and speciation in amphibians.
Finally some video: TV reporter Donald Forsdyke at Queens University, Ontario, has a series of Youtube talks on various aspects of evolution worth looking at. In particular check out the one on Mendelian inheritance and Speciation under Branching Evolution.
Last and least, I have an editorial on reconstructing the past in evolution in Bayes, Evolutionary Clocks and Biogeography. Rupert won’t be happy. Until next time at some little known blog by the name of Pharyngula, this is the news…
Get your Evolution Carnival posts in soon!
There’s only a week left to submit to the next Carnival of Evolution hosted here! Hop to it folks, or I’ll have to link to my own posts, and nobody wants that.
Filed under Administrative, Evolution
Community, unbelief, and the rise of secularism
One of the things that losing full use of a limb causes, is that everything takes four times as long as it used to. So I haven’t blogged due to my being very busy, tired, or both. Sorry. I promised to reflect out loud on the Global Atheist Conspiracy Convention, but haven’t been able to find time to think. It’s Saturday in the Favoured Nation, so here goes.
This was the first time I attended such an event. I didn’t quite know what to expect. I have been to many ideology-based conferences, events and happenings over the years and one thing that they all have in common is attempting to build a sense of community. Indeed, that is what my friend and Good Twin PZ Myers spoke on. We had lunch the day before his talk and I noted a few things I’d like to share with you now.
First of all if you want to build a community you have to have a set of shared values, rituals and practices. These are, if you like, the nature of the community. Since atheism is defined in various ways, that is difficult, and PZ tried to define the atheist community in terms of truth, autonomy and community. The problem is, these are values also held by many other communities, and they are not the very same communities. I know many liberal religious folk who also value science, truth and personal autonomy, and many atheists who do not. So while I applaud his picking these values, he hasn’t quite picked out the identifier and community builders of an atheist community.
What does achieve this? Well, we can look to other successful community building traditions. One of the most obvious is, of course, religion. What is it that makes religion so socially persistent and able to withstand thousands of years of change? My answer, the one I gave to PZ, was the Costly Signalling hypothesis: what makes a religion stable and causes social cohesion is not the ideas they share, but the absurd and contingent flags they carry. The reason why, for example, a Baptist can go anywhere in the world and find a community among any ethnicity, language, or class, is that what unites Baptists everywhere are a set of practices and beliefs so silly that one can only share them with other Baptists. That is, by the way, why creationism is so socially adaptive: the only folk you can share it with in practice are those who are in your community. Everybody else just laughs at you (yes, Xenu. I’m looking at you).
The Costly Signalling Hypothesis (CSH) is based on work done by evolutionary theorist Amotz Zahavi, who proposed that apparently handicapping traits like the peacock’s tail serve as honest advertisements. They show the virtues of the organism by signalling in ways that cannot be faked. This has been taken up as an explanation of social facets of religion, as the costly signalling hypothesis of religion promoted by Joseph Bulbulia. What makes one a member of the community is that one is advertising in costly ways that one is a member.

Even such apparently easy things as crossing oneself is costly, because the signalling is to be automatic (and in the right direction: orthodox do it the opposite way to Catholics), and it takes a lot of time to make it so. Learning catechisms, going to services, saying rosaries and so forth all take an investment of time and effort, and as time and effort are scarce resources, the result is that one is not able to easily fake being a member of that community.
![]()
Add to this tithing, sacrifices, volunteering in burial societies and charitable work, and so forth, and to be a member of a community like this is not for the dilettante. Atheism has nothing comparable. At best it has the wearing of the Atheist “A” or t-shirts with the relevant slogans. Its charitable work tends to be state run through local government and health agencies. It is hard to identify community when the community is not definable in terms that are positive, and atheism counts as “unbelief” in other people’s defining views.
Now I have argued before that there are many senses of atheism (I am a functional atheist, in that I do not live my life on the basis of the possibility of gods existing; I am a philosophical agnostic in that I do not rule all deities out. Go read my arguments). A positive atheist has a costly belief in our present social context: to positively disbelieve in a deity is to mark oneself out as a baby-killing oath-breaker. But many people, like me, are atheists only in the sense that they happen to lack a belief in a deity. What are our costly signals?
Why this matters is in part due to the very reasons why the social aspect of religions evolved in the first place. In traditional societies, which were small, you knew every person, their relatedness to you (according to some social conventions), and whether you were equals, or one was subordinate to the other. This sets up a “working memory” constraint – we can only track these relationships for a certain number of people (possibly Dunbar’s Number, or about 150 individuals plus or minus). This matters because you need to calculate (or intuit – I’m not supposing that you actually do a computation) the coefficient of relatedness to work out to whom you owe, and from whom you are owed, mutual aid. This is known as reciprocal altruism. I owe my family more aid than I owe someone I am more distantly related to (Haldane’s quip about sacrificing one’s life for two siblings or eight cousins illustrates this). We evolved through kin selection, but when we get into larger societies, that breaks down.
When societies become cosmopolitan, which is effectively to say when they become sedentary, territorial and agricultural, there are too many people to track. You need to know who you owe reciprocal altruism to, and who you do not, and this is an urgent issue. There are too many people to help all the time, or else your resources will become exhausted as parasites exploit you. You need also to know who can be relied upon to help you or your children and family in hard times. In urbanised society, that is a nontrivial issue.
So honest signalling is a way of ensuring this sort of conformity and reciprocality. And atheists do not have it. Anyone can wear the badge or t-shirt, and there is no exclusion of defectors, apart from nasty comments on a blog. Something is needed that is not universally attractive, so that it doesn’t also include humanists, liberal progressives, communists, existentialists, and all the other ideologies in play in the same general intellectual stream.
My experience of the Convention was that most there were pleased to be in a majority of like-minded people (not, I hasten to add, identically-minded people), but this led sometimes to the other side of social cohesion: exclusion. Those who disagreed with the majority view were sometimes sneered at, sometimes mocked and sometimes made the objects of hatred outright. I was very disappointed with the general tendency to demonise Muslims, as if the tribal imamism of the Taliban was comparable with the urbane Islam of a Turkish or Pakistani scientist or public intellectual. The extreme stereotyping was almost laughable in its viciousness, if not for the fact that this was the community that was, according to the slogan of the convention, celebrating reason.
A socially cohesive group that defines an in-group by definition defines out groups as well. You can call them “sheep”, “fools”, or worse, “inhuman”, the traditional way to justify treating the out group badly. Many tribal societies call themselves something like “the people” and outsiders something like “ghosts” or “demons”. We see this more subtly when Christians state as fact that atheists themselves cannot be fully human (because they are immoral, deny their spiritual side, or fail to have the full range of emotions like love).
Atheists, lacking much in the way of a “nature”, seem to find most of their in-group identification in terms of defining the out-group. This makes sense if the movement is defined by the rejection of someone else’s views. This is why I spent so much time trying to identify what the term means in my “Atheism, agnosticism and theism” series. If we can find a set of views that atheists, and only atheists hold, and they are costly and hard to fake, then we have a chance of a community developing. My fear is that there is no such signal. Perhaps we could invent one (maybe rituals involving the reading of famous atheist writings at meetings), but I think that unless it happens more organically, the hope for an atheist community, complete with reciprocal aid, is pretty forlorn.
As I sit in my bedsit, unable to move, I find it interesting that atheists and agnostics have not banded together to come to help me. Instead, I was helped by two people: someone who was raised in Christian virtues and someone who is a secularised Jew. Both are irreligious, and both are atheists, but they are not helping me qua atheists, but as friends, and had I no friends here in Melbourne, I would have been alone. This would not have been the case if I were a Baptist still. Most of the assistance I have got comes from the Catholic hospital I went to in the first place.
I have often complained about the tribalism of atheism. I still do, because I identify myself largely as a humanist rather than an atheist (there’s a set of values for you!). But it should be said that PZ is right: atheists need a community. Religions, along with political movements, sporting clubs, and hobby associations, all have worked out how to do this. Atheists should perhaps observe this and work out how to do it too. Just don’t build cathedrals to atheism, okay, unless you are prepared to fund science in them.
Filed under Creationism and Intelligent Design, General Science, Philosophy, Rant, Religion
Update
I spent the weekend going to the Global Atheist Conspiracy Convention, courtesy of PZ Myers, the organisers, and Neil Thomason who drove me. I will write some extended reflections on it over the next few days, but I have a lot of things to resolve first, like how to shower, park places, and get around using crutches.
I must apologise to the GAC organisers for my ill-tempered rant a while back on why I wasn’t invited: the format is so obviously based on large scale presentations they would have had few opportunities for lesser lights to present. I was expecting something like an academic conference with multiple sessions running simultaneously. So apologies. I will get more active in the local Melbourne Atheist, Freethinker, and Skeptical community over the next little while.
For the moment, enjoy this (click through for the rest of the comic):
Filed under Philosophy




